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This research in Ethical Control of Unmanned Systems applies precepts of Network 
Optional Warfare (NOW) to develop a three-step Mission Execution Ontology (MEO) 
methodology for validating, simulating, and implementing mission orders for unmanned 
systems. First, mission orders are represented in ontologies that are understandable by humans 
and readable by machines. Next, the MEO is validated and tested for logical coherence using 
Semantic Web standards. The validated MEO is refined for implementation in simulation and 
visualization. This process is iterated until the MEO is ready for implementation. This 
methodology is applied to four Naval scenarios in order of increasing challenges that the 
operational environment and the adversary impose on the Human-Machine Team. The extent of 
challenge to Ethical Control in the scenarios is used to refine the MEO for the unmanned system.  
The research also considers Data-Centric Security and blockchain distributed ledger as 
enabling technologies for Ethical Control. Data-Centric Security is a combination of structured 
messaging, efficient compression, digital signature, and document encryption, in correct order, 
for round-trip messaging. Blockchain distributed ledger has potential to further add integrity 
measures for aggregated message sets, confirming receipt/response/sequencing without 
undetected message loss. When implemented, these technologies together form the end-to-end 
data security that ensures mutual trust and command authority in real-world operational 
environments—despite the potential presence of interfering network conditions, intermittent 
gaps, or potential opponent intercept.  
A coherent Ethical Control approach to command and control of unmanned systems is 
thus feasible. Therefore, this research concludes that maintaining human control of unmanned 
systems at long ranges of time-duration and distance, in denied, degraded, and deceptive 
environments, is possible through well-defined mission orders and data security technologies. 
Finally, as the human role remains essential in Ethical Control of unmanned systems, this 
research recommends the development of an unmanned system qualification process for Naval 



























As humans proliferate unmanned systems and advance unmanned systems technology 
ahead of emerging policy and guidance, development of unmanned systems autonomy, as well as 
command and control in Human-Machine Teaming, needs to be grounded in ethical and 
responsible-use principles. Human supervision using Ethical Control is required for any 
unmanned systems holding potential for lethal force. In denied, degraded, and deceptive 
operational environments, the human commanders must maintain Ethical Control of unmanned 
systems, and the unmanned systems must perform their missions that require the use of force—
from lifesaving to lethal force, within the assigned operational and ethical constraints. 
This research in Ethical Control of Unmanned Systems develops a three-step Mission 
Execution Ontology (MEO) methodology for implementing, validating, and simulating mission 
orders for unmanned systems. The methodology makes it possible to determine the extent to 
which unmanned systems can handle progressive challenges to command and control (C2) in 
distance and time, in human-machine teams, and in employing lifesaving or lethal force as 
authorized by the commander. The three steps in the MEO methodology are:  
1. Represent orders in ontologies that are human-understandable and machine-readable.  
2. Validate and test the MEO is validated and tested for logical coherence.  
3. Assess the MEO for executability in simulation and visualization. 
As context for the MEO methodology, the research considers multiple Naval scenarios as 
exemplar missions in order of increasing challenges that the operational environment and the 
adversary impose on the Human-Machine Team. These scenarios carefully define and test 
capabilities for Ethical Control of unmanned systems in progressively increasing challenges in 
distance and time, human-machine teams, and the use of force. Mission titles and brief 
descriptions of the unmanned systems assigned tasks are: 
A. Sailor Overboard: Perform recovery operations in concert with shipboard procedures. 
B. Lifeboat Tracking: Provide remote presence for locating, tracking, communications 
and beaconing an adrift lifeboat carrying multiple personnel. 
C. Pirate Boats Attack: Overtake pirates attempting to capture a merchant ship. Provide 
warning and counterattack using lethal force, if escalation of hostilities is warranted. 
D. Hospital Ship Electromagnetic (EM) Decoy: Respond appropriately to EM signatures 
of a warship unexpectedly emitting from a hospital ship due to adversary exploitation. 
 viii 
Of note, exemplar mission D (Hospital Ship EM Decoy) presents the most ethically 
challenging scenario for the unmanned system and the Human-Machine Team. Two variations of 
this scenario demonstrate the significance of Ethical Control of unmanned systems:  
• Sense-Decide-Act: Immediate reaction to deploy a robot swarm results in a mistaken 
attack on friendly or neutral shipping, and is consequently a war crime. 
• Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA): Deliberate tactics and Ethical Control 
constraints prevent automatic erroneous counterattack against false flag placed on 
friendly/neutral shipping, improving ship defense and warfighting capabilities. 
By applying MEO methodology in these scenarios, an assessment scale emerges for 
human warfighters qualifying unmanned systems performing missions under Ethical Control: 
Level 1: Basic. Qualified to apply lifesaving force under close coordination with the 
Human Commander, e.g., Sailor Overboard Recovery mission. 
Level 2: Intermediate. Qualified to apply lifesaving force at long distance from the 
Human Commander, e.g., Search and Rescue mission. 
Level 3: Advanced. Qualified to apply organic lifesaving/lethal force over long time 
periods for the mission, emphasizing restraint throughout, e.g., Counter-Piracy mission.  
Level 4: Operational Standard. Qualified to apply organic lifesaving/lethal force in 
contested/deceptive environments, e.g., Force Protection mission. Uses human 
confirmation of Identification Friend, Foe, Neutral, or Unknown (IFFNU) classification 
result to detect spoofing anti-pattern, with authorization required to apply lethal force, 
prevent reflexive automatic counterattack response, and engage with proportional force.  
The research also applies Data-Centric Security to enable end-to-end data security that 
ensures mutual trust and command authority in real-world operational environments— despite 
the potential presence of interfering network conditions, intermittent gaps, or potential opponent 
intercept. Data-Centric Security is a combination of structured messaging, efficient compression, 
digital signature, and document encryption, in correct order, for round-trip messaging. Addition 
of blockchain distributed ledger has potential to further add integrity measures for aggregated 
message sets, confirming receipt/response/sequencing without undetected message loss. 
Maintaining Ethical Control of unmanned systems from long time-duration and physical 
distance—in denied, degraded, and deceptive environments—is now possible through well-
defined mission orders and data security technologies. Furthermore, the MEO methodology 
conveys the mission orders in formats that are readable and sharable by both humans and 
unmanned systems—with validatable syntax and semantics through understandable logical 
constraints. The MEO is also testable and confirmable using simulation and visualization. 
Additional Semantic Web confirmation can ensure that orders are comprehensive and consistent. 
 ix 
Therefore, a coherent Ethical Control approach to human command and control of unmanned 
systems such as the MEO methodology supports the development of an unmanned systems 
qualification process for Naval operations.  
The research recommends topics for additional research that are prioritized based on 
urgency and impact. Recommendations are summarized below: 
1. Incorporate Ethical Control in Unmanned Maritime Autonomy Architecture (UMAA) 
and Common Control System (CCS). Action: Brief relevant program managers and 
stakeholders; seek to participate in UMAA. 
2. Determine implications in Integrated Naval Force Structure. Actions: 
a. Engage staffs in Navy Warfare Directorates, Type Commanders, unmanned 
vehicle squadrons, and relevant stakeholders. Topics for engagement include: 
operations, plans, policy, and requirements, and resourcing of unmanned 
systems with due regard to the feasibility of applying Ethical Control in 
enabling them to conduct qualified missions. 
b. Establish an NPS Center for Ethical Warfighting to explore both educational 
and applied capabilities, in order to put theory into practice. 
c. Establish collaboration within the Naval Education Enterprise (e.g., NPS, 
Naval War College, Marine Corps University, and Naval Academy) and other 
institutions, e.g., U.S. Military Academy, on ethical use of unmanned systems. 
3. Establish a process to qualify unmanned systems, i.e., design and develop 
qualification requirements (similar to Naval Warfighter “qualification cards”) for 
various classes of unmanned systems that ensure Ethical and Secure C2 for Naval 
missions in denied/degraded/deceptive environments. Key Actions:  
a. Apply the MEO methodology to test and certify compliance to mission orders. 
b. Integrate Data-Centric Security in a qualification process to ensure Trusted 
Autonomy and Command Authority for the Human-Machine Team. 
c. Use a comprehensive virtual environment with carefully crafted scenarios to 
test key requirements and capabilities, hardware/software in the loop, as well 
as visualization of rehearsal, real-time and replay of realistic missions. 
d. Assess mission logs and scenario outcomes for after-action analysis, lessons 
learned, and continuous improvement. 
4. Continue Canonical Mission development and ontology refinements on tactical 
scenarios that exercise the checkpoints and authorities of ethical control. 
5. Implement planned improvements in Autonomous Vehicle Command Language 
(AVCL) and Autonomous Unmanned Vehicle Workbench (AUV Workbench). 
6. Incorporate Data-Centric Security for system integrity and security of unmanned 
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 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PROJECT DESCRIPTION 
Researchers and Faculty at the Naval Postgraduate School and the (then) Raytheon 
Company performed this research project within the Raytheon–Naval Postgraduate School 
Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (NCRADA-NPS-19-0227) for Naval 
Warfare Capability Research and Development. The intention of this work is to research 
methods of Undersea Command, Control, and Communications (C3) for ethical human 
supervision of unmanned undersea systems. 
Ethical control of unmanned systems can be accomplished through structured mission 
definitions that are consistently readable, validatable and understandable by humans and robots.  




This research is motivated by ethically constrained control of unmanned systems and 
robot missions by human supervisors and warfighters. With the Artificial Intelligence/Machine 
Learning (AI/ML) technologies and proliferation of unmanned systems potentially advancing 
ahead of emerging policy and guidance, clarity and distinction are needed in defining and 
guiding technology development for Human-Machine Teaming that is grounded in principles of 
ethical and responsible use. This research is thus intended to stimulate and shape the 
development of ethical autonomous unmanned undersea weapons systems. Ethical Control is not 
simply an AI problem, rather it is a moral imperative.  Warfighters cannot push “the big red 
shiny AI button” and hope for the best, since indiscriminate actions are immoral and unlawful.  
As expressed by the guiding senior faculty member in this decades-long endeavor,  
Ethical constraints on robot mission execution are possible today. There is no 
need to wait for future developments in Artificial Intelligence (AI). It is a moral 
imperative that ethical constraints in some form be introduced immediately into 
the software of all robots that are capable of inflicting unintended or deliberate 
harm to humans or property. (McGhee, April 2016) 
 
 2 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 
The key research question is: Can qualified robots correctly follow human orders? 
Through this research, the following precept has enabled the Collaborators to answer it in the 
affirmative: Well-structured mission orders can be syntactically and semantically validated to 
give human commanders confidence that offboard systems will do what they are told to do, and 
further will not do what they are forbidden to do. 
 3 
II. OVERVIEW 
A. SUMMARY OF WORK 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and Raytheon co-Principal Investigators researched the 
impacts and limitations of current ethics policies on the design, development, and deployment of 
unmanned undersea weapons. The Collaborators researched current ethics principles and policy 
considerations that impact ethical human supervision of autonomous underwater unmanned 
systems in tactical scenarios; this effort was continuous throughout the research project in order 
to ensure its relevance to current and emerging policies, standards, and practices. They 
investigated how warfighters can effectively and ethically supervise underwater unmanned 
systems at great ranges as trusted participants with distant human supervision. (This report uses 
the terms unmanned systems, robots, and autonomous vehicles interchangeably.)  
The Principal Investigators determined the applicability of the ethics principles and 
policies (e.g., DoD Directive 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapon Systems) to a variety of current and 
in-development U.S. Navy systems, such as Unmanned Undersea Vehicles (UUVs). After 
consideration of appropriate real-world tactical scenarios in maritime operations that might be 
relevant for this research, they selected four unrestricted scenarios as surrogates to their 
respective classified scenarios. Then by applying Semantic Web ontology to scenario goals and 
constraints, they performed logical validation that human-approved mission orders for robots are 
semantically coherent, precise, unambiguous, and without internal contradictions. Mission 
Execution Ontology (MEO) methodology is the term the researchers conceived for the process, 
from defining mission orders to validating them. 
The MEO methodology begins with Mission Definition. The researchers (or operational 
planners and mission analysts in military operations in real-world military operation planning 
organizations) analyze the mission orders by phases of execution and the associated decisions for 
each phase. Mission analysts consider and diagram the flow of mission phases by relationships 
between the phases and the logic state of the decision made at the completion of each phase. 
Analysts use a “tri-state” goal-transition logic to direct the flow of decision between goals. The 
tri-state logic states are: Success, Failure, and Exception, with respect to accomplishing the goal 
for each phase of the mission. For example, if the Deploy phase of the mission is accomplished 
as Success, then the mission would proceed to the next phase. If the state of the Deploy phase 
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results in Failure, then the mission would proceed to a phase to perform troubleshooting or 
failure recovery actions. If the Deploy phase actions result in an Exception logic state, then the 
mission would proceed to a phase to perform holding or awaiting further instructions tasks.  
Once analysts decide on a set of mission orders as defined by a corresponding decision-
flow diagram, the Autonomous Vehicle Command Language (AVCL) can be used for formal 
definition and subsequent generation of code for each unmanned system executing a mission. 
AVCL mission descriptions are expressed using structured Extensible Markup Language (XML) 
that represents human command and control tasks for autonomous unmanned vehicles (AUVs). 
AVCL is used to generate mission scripts, agenda plans and post-mission recorded telemetry. 
Mission analysts or operators can utilize a single achievable and validatable format for robot 
tasking and results that is directly convertible to (and from) a wide variety of different robot 
command languages. As such, analysts now apply the Web Ontology Language (OWL) 
Semantic Web Standards to AVCL representation of the mission orders and thus converts the 
mission orders into ontologies (i.e., the MEO vocabulary) in order to validate the mission orders 
for ethical control—that the orders are semantically coherent, precise, unambiguous, and without 
internal contradictions. Finally, modeling and simulation are used to confirm ethical control of 
mission design and execution.  
In addition to applying the MEO methodology, the Collaborators also have considered 
environmental, geopolitical, security and human life implications for associated anti-
tamper/cyber solutions, and have provided recommended courses of action for further 
development. These relevant elements of the unmanned systems would contribute to the 
effective application of ethical control, forming the foundation of Trusted Command Authority, 
Trusted Mission Orders, and Trusted Mission Execution. 
 
B. REPORT ORGANIZATION 
Chapter 3 describes the background of research on Techniques for Maintaining Human 
Ethical Control of Unmanned Systems that NPS researchers have been conducting since 1994, 
leading up to this current research project. Chapter 4 discusses the methodology the current 
research uses to represent Mission Execution Orders in AVCL and Semantic Web Standards. 
Chapter 5 presents the application of the MEO methodology. Chapter 6 discusses the enabling 
technologies we have considered that would ensure secure, ethical command and control 
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between the human commander/operator and the autonomous systems. Chapter 7 presents 
conclusions from this research.  Chapter 8 offers recommendations for follow-on research in 
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III. BACKGROUND 
A. HISTORY AND TRAJECTORY OF RESEARCH 
NPS began research on autonomous underwater vehicles (AUV) in the early 1990s. The 
first vehicle, tested at sea in the mid-1990s, was Phoenix, an AUV that was 6 feet long and 
weighed approximately 600 pounds. At that time, the onboard control system was called RBM 
for “Rational Behavior Model.” RBM was modeled on standard Naval practice for deployment 
and operation of manned submarines at the time. 
The top level of the three-layer RBM software architecture assumed that Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) was required to replace the function of a Submarine Commander. For example, 
mathematical modeling and programming of a Commander’s function would need first-order 
logic (predicate calculus). Therefore, a separate “SPARC” workstation running the “Prolog” 
language was included in Phoenix. RBM functioned well in Phoenix’s at-sea testing. 
In the early 2000s, Phoenix was replaced by a larger vehicle called Aries, which 
contained a more advanced onboard sensor suite, larger batteries, and more powerful main 
propulsion thrusters. Aries was approximately 8 feet long and weighed about 1,000 pounds, and 
was capable of longer duration and more complex missions than its predecessor. Experience with 
Phoenix led the researchers to full practical realization that mission control based on human-style 
reasoning (predicate logic) cannot, in general, be formally proven correct for a given mission. 
Fortunately, the researchers also came to realize that “finite state” logic is adequate for any 
mission control tasks they actually anticipated carrying out by autonomous vehicles. In contrast 
to their experience with Phoenix, Aries researchers were able to prove by exhaustion of all 
possible outcomes that its missions were correctly programmed (that is, that they accomplished 
what we intended). Aries was a success, and was retired after completion of all planned mission 
tasks. All results were published, with references and primary results available at: 
https://savage.nps.edu/EthicalControl/documentation. 
In the early 2010s, NPS researchers began to realize that responsible experimentation 
with larger and more powerful robots (AUVs or others) would require that some run-time ethical 
constraints be incorporated into mission control software. This was not done for Phoenix or 
Aries. As the researchers addressed this requirement, it became apparent to them that inclusion of 
such constraints would require a possible “exception” outcome of execution of a mission phase 
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goal (command) in addition to the “success” and “failure” outcomes we had previously 
considered. This change greatly simplifies mission logic and clarity without loss of generality. 
This understanding was summarized in the 2018 Journal of Oceanic Engineering paper that was 
based on such “tri-state” logic. (Brutzman, Blais, Davis, and McGhee, April 2018) 
Since publication of the 2018 paper, the NPS researchers have been concerned with 
implementation details for tri-state mission logic for autonomous robots and human/robot teams. 
To date, the researchers have demonstrated, in human interactive form, execution of a simulated 
8-phase “Sailor Overboard” recovery mission by a human/robot team, using either Prolog or 
Common Lisp as a programming language. The researchers expect to complete an XML 
implementation soon. 
A key aspect of tri-state logic, including possible violation of an ethical constraint, either 
pending or actual, is the need for constant situational awareness by mission control software. The 
researchers believe that mandating this type of software for mission control could possibly have 
prevented loss of human life in recent passenger aircraft and self-driving car accidents. 
Therefore, further applied research on this issue is critical and is needed as soon as possible. 
 
B. KEY INSIGHTS REGARDING HUMAN ETHICAL CONTROL 
Many years of work have composed multiple fields of study to provide techniques for 
maintaining human ethical control of unmanned systems. In this work, ethical theory meets 
professional practice. A key tenet researchers are keenly mindful of in this project is that each 
step of the research must work for Human Commanders and Unmanned Systems alike. The 
following insights and techniques for maintaining human ethical control of Unmanned Systems 
apply to this project (Davis, Brutzman, Blais, and McGhee, 2016): 
1. Ethical operation of robotic systems requires human accountability. 
In military operations, human Warfighters in military units are able to deal with moral 
challenges without ethical quandaries, by using formally qualified experience, and by following 
mission orders that comply with Rules of Engagement (ROE) and Laws of Armed Conflict 
(LOAC). However, ethical behaviors do not define the mission plan. Instead, ethical constraints 
inform the mission plan. In the context of current and future Naval operations, Naval Forces can 
only command mission orders that are Understandable by (legally culpable) human 
Warfighters—then reliably and safely executed by robots. In both the legal and moral sense, this 
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paradigm implies that human operators must be in a position to understand, and therefore 
control, robot mission outcomes. This level of understanding can be achieved through the 
satisfaction of three requirements: Operator understanding of high-level mission flow; mission 
descriptions understandable to both human operators and robot vehicles being tasked; and 
mission descriptions consisting entirely of trusted behaviors and constraints. 
2. Algorithms cannot replace human responsibility. 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) approaches in general almost invariably make use of easily 
confounded inferential reasoning or statistical pattern recognition. Applying such broad 
abstractions to the innumerable situations that can arise in the real world is inherently 
unpredictable, and also makes unrealistic any assumption of responsibility by human operators. 
It is therefore apparent that the abstract reasoning of general AI approaches is inappropriate, at 
least at the present time, for the highest level of robot mission definition and control. 
By applying the best strengths of human ethical responsibility, repeatable formal logic 
and directable unmanned systems together, these combined capabilities provide a practical 
framework for ethically grounded human supervision of unmanned systems. 
 
C. ETHICAL MISSION DEFINITION AND EXECUTION 
Experts and practitioners have worked long and hard toward achieving functionally 
capable robots. While numerous areas of progress have been achieved, ethical control of 
unmanned systems in a manner that meets legal requirements has been elusive and problematic. 
Common conclusions that treat ethical robots as an always-amoral philosophical conundrum, 
requiring undemonstrated morality-based artificial intelligence (AI) schemes, are simply not 
sensible or repeatable. Patterning after successful practice by human teams shows that precise 
mission definition and task execution using well-defined, syntactically valid vocabularies is a 
necessary first step. Addition of operational constraints enables humans to place limits on robot 
activities, even when operating at a distance under gapped communications. Semantic validation 
can then be provided by a MEO to confirm that no logical or legal contradictions are present in 
mission orders. Thorough simulation, testing, and certification of qualified robot responses are 
necessary to build human authority and trust when directing ethical robot operations at a 
distance. Together these capabilities can provide safeguards for autonomous robots possessing 
the potential for lethal force. This approach appears to have broad usefulness for both civil and 
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military application of unmanned systems at sea. (Brutzman, Blais, Davis, and McGhee, April 
2018) 
In “Semantic Web and Inferencing Technologies for Mission Definition,” (Davis, 2014), 
Davis summarizes that operational commanders and intelligence professionals are provided with 
a continually increasing volume of data from numerous sources. Effective utilization of this data 
can be hampered by difficulties in fusing different data streams for presentation, correlating 
related data from various sources and developing reliable summary and predictive products. An 
opportunity presently exists to improve this situation through the incorporation of Semantic Web 
technologies into Department of Defense (DoD) systems. Earlier work provides a didactic 
overview of Description Logics (DL) and their implementation in Semantic Web languages and 
technologies to include the mathematical properties supporting robust knowledge representation 
to address military applications. Subsequently, the algorithms for automated reasoning and 
inferencing with DLs are discussed. Included in this discussion is a comparison of available 
Semantic Web applications for ontology development and realization or DL reasoning 
capabilities with real-world knowledge bases. Finally, mechanisms for applying AI techniques to 




A. MISSION REPRESENTATION USING AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE COMMAND 
LANGUAGE (AVCL) 
Informed by aforementioned research efforts, this research sought to realize a structured 
vocabulary to define unmanned-system missions that is understandable by human commanders 
and useful in multiple programming languages, plus Semantic Web logical queries, in order to 
facilitate formalizing mission ontologies, i.e., MEO. Based on this realization, Autonomous 
Vehicle Command Language (AVCL) is used for the MEO process. 
AVCL is a command and control language for humans supervising autonomous 
unmanned vehicles. Clarity of the ontology represented by AVCL arises from close 
correspondence to human Naval terminology. AVCL has structured vocabulary defining terms 
and relationships for mission planning, execution, conduct, recording and replay across diverse 
robot types. Additionally, AVCL has common-ground Extensible Markup Language (XML) 
representations for mission agenda plans, mission scripts, and post-mission recorded telemetry 
results. Through AVCL, operators have a single archivable, validatable format for robot tasking, 
and results are directly convertible to and from a wide variety of different robot command 
languages. 
A consideration for future work in AVCL is defining unit tests and expected results for 
mission verification and validation. This approach can grow as the basis of robot qualification by 
humans, and formal techniques for verification, validation, and accreditation (VV&A).  The 
following website contains detailed information on AVCL: 
https://savage.nps.edu/Savage/AuvWorkbench/AVCL/AVCL.html 
The MEO methodology applies well-developed Semantic Web Standards that integrate 
queries and reasoning to AVCL for logical consistency checks. This integration of Semantic 
Web Standards and AVCL results in the MEO methodology having an additional benefit of 
laying a foundation for an open system architecture framework for implementing ethical control 
of unmanned systems.  
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B. KEY BENEFITS OF APPLYING SEMANTIC WEB STANDARDS IN MISSION 
EXECUTION ONTOLOGY (MEO) 
This section highlights three benefits of the integration of Semantic Web Standards with 
AVCL representations of mission orders that form the basis of MEO. 
1. Improving Semantic Representation 
Knowledge Representation (KR) is an area of AI research and practice focused on 
encoding meaning into data. Academia and industry now have a detailed path toward higher 
levels of machine understanding corresponding to human understanding. Figure 1 depicts the 
Ontology Spectrum in terms of a relationship between search capability into a data set and its 
metadata that would lead to understanding the semantics of the data set. The figure shows that 
semantic representation improves as the search capability increases from simple recovery of data 
to being able to reason from the data. 
 
 
Figure 1. The Ontology Spectrum. Acronyms: Database (DB). Extensible Markup Language (XML). 
Resource Description Format / Schema (RDF/S). Unified Modeling Language (UML). Web Ontology 
Language (OWL). (Orbst and Davis, May 2015) 
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2. Improving Interoperability 
This project defines Interoperability as “the capability of a system to automatically, 
without human intervention, provide services to and accept services from other systems, and to 
use the services so exchanged to enable the systems to work together to achieve a desired 
outcome” (Blais and Lacy, 2004). Academia and industry have laid out a path toward higher 
levels of interoperability. Figure 2 shows the Levels of Conceptual Interoperability Model 
(LCIM) (Tolk et al., January 2006). The LCIM categorizes interoperability in six levels, from 
Level 0 (No Interoperability) to Level 6 (Conceptual Interoperability). The objective is to 
achieve conceptual and pragmatic interoperability such that the systems may be composable. 
 
 
Figure 2. Levels of Conceptual Interoperability Model. (Tolk et al., January 2006) 
 
3. Scalable Application 
Architects of the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) have laid out a layered set of 
standards to achieve the Semantic Web vision: “not a separate Web but an extension of the 
current one, in which information is given well-defined meaning, better enabling computers and 
people to work in cooperation” (Berners-Lee et al., 2001). The ultimate goal for the Semantic 
 14 
Web is to achieve a scalable trusted information infrastructure where humans and software 
interact meaningfully, in a repeatable environment where expectations of quality and integrity 
are met. Most relevant to the MEO methodology is the scalable approach of the Semantic Web 
standards, which indicates that single (ship + robot) solutions have the potential to grow and 
encompass many simultaneous systems, and achieve improved data sharing, mission de-
confliction, and coordinated operations. 
Figure 3 shows the architecture of the Semantic Web Stack. This architecture extends the 
larger World Wide Web architecture. All of the Semantic Web data languages are approved 
W3C Recommendations, meaning formal standards that have undergone a rigorous process for 
broad inputs and tested results. Examining each of the critical blocks in this figure, it is clear that 
proof and unifying logic are mathematically well-defined. Trust-derived (composed) statements 
in the Semantic Web architecture arise from encryption and digital signature, confirming trusted 
data sources. Formal logic of trust statements is the basis for deriving new information. This 
project exercises every layer of the Semantic Web Stack (“Semantic Web Stack,” 2020). 
 
 
Figure 3. The Semantic Web Stack. (“Semantic Web Stack,” 2020) 
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C. MEO DEVELOPMENT USING SEMANTIC WEB STANDARDS 
This section describes the development of the MEO methodology that leverages these 
aforementioned benefits of Semantic Web standards. The methodology developed in the project 
for MEO—representation of mission orders for robots in ontological forms using Semantic Web 
standards—consists of the following tasks: 
• Define MEO from concepts, properties, relationships using Protégé tool. 
• Create full set of canonical missions in AVCL (XML). 
• Transform AVCL representation of the missions into corresponding subject-predicate-
object triples using Semantic Web standards in OWL. 
• Confirm that AVCL MEO missions validate satisfactorily using Protégé. 
• Automate build process as a suite of repeatable unit-test queries (log). 
• Write SPARQL Protocol and RDF Query Language (SPARQL) metaqueries to test and 
demonstrate MEO concepts and relationships. 
• Write SPARQL queries to test AVCL mission representations in Turtle. 
Specific tasks for developing the MEO methodology above are performed in the Apache 
Ant software building tool. Refer to the project website (link provided in Appendix A) for 
additional documentation. 
 
1. Ontology Definition 
Table 1 summarizes the key elements used in the MEO methodology that work together 
to implement the aforementioned tasks to represent mission orders for unmanned systems. 
 
Table 1. Summary of Relationships in MEO Methodology for Ethical Control of Unmanned Systems in 
Surrogate Scenarios 
Key Element Contribution to MEO Methodology 
Autonomous Vehicle Command Language (AVCL) 
for Missions 
• Declarative XML, years of NPS research. 
Multiple Mission Representations • Imperative commands (orders/waypoints/etc.). 
• Declarative commands (mission goals). 
• Mission results (order log, telemetry etc.). 
• Mission metadata for parameters, settings. 
• Lisp and Prolog examples (Bob McGhee, NPS). 
Autonomous Unmanned Vehicle (AUV) 
Workbench Simulation and Visualization Support 
• Recently restored, debug testing commenced. 
• AVCL 2.1 is prior published version, centered on 
syntactic validation, solo robot operations. 
• AVCL 3.0 is new working version for testing 
range of multi-participant missions. 
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Key Element Contribution to MEO Methodology 
Mission Execution Ontology (MEO) for Semantic 
Validation 
• Semantic Web framework of rules, relationships 
for ethical validation. 
• Initial examples in IEEE JOE paper. 
• Retested using current Protégé, Jena tools. 
Sailor Overboard and Other Missions • Hand-crafted triples using Turtle syntax. 
• Beginning to build unit testing framework. 
• Confirming correlation of AVCL information 
model to existing MEO ontology. 
• Automatic conversion of AVCL missions to 
match, thus accelerating multiple-mission testing 
on diverse systems. 
• Visualization, reporting via AUV Workbench can 
aid understanding, mission planning and further 
progress. 
 
Figure 4 is a diagram of the unmanned vehicle MEO that shows how the aforementioned 
key elements interrelate. The MEO interrelates the mission order to the unmanned vehicle based 
on the concepts of Mission, Goal, Intended Outcome, Constraint, and End Condition, as well as 
Vehicle and Vehicle Feature to perform the mission. The interrelationships between the concepts 
may be Asserted or Inferred. An Asserted relationship is one that is explicitly declared in AVCL 




Figure 4. Unmanned Vehicle MEO 
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2. Ontology Testing 
Once the interrelationships of the MEO are defined, a Semantic Web Standards tool such 
as Protégé is then used to implement and test the ontology for reasonableness and non-
contradiction. Figure 5 is a graphical depiction of MEO in Protégé. 
 
Figure 5. MEO Testing Using Protégé Tool 
3. Ontology Confirmation and Validation 
Semantic query language is used to confirm the mission ontology. This research uses 
SPARQL, standardized as a W3C recommendation, to express queries in RDF/ OWL or Turtle 
syntax against the missions represented in AVCL. The query results of the MEO reveal 
interesting properties about the missions that are otherwise difficult to determine. Inferences in 
MEO can also be combined and correlated. The goal of MEO confirmation using semantic query 
language is to express in-depth mission-related queries that determine whether all logical mission 
prerequisites and constraints are satisfied, and whether tactical policies and Rules of Engagement 
(ROE) are met.  
After the MEO of the mission order is implemented and tested for reasonableness and 
non-contradiction, a Semantic Web Standards tool can be used to validate the MEO. Figure 6 is a 
graphical example of a mission validation using the Protégé tool. 
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Figure 6. Example Mission Validation Using Protégé Tool 
 
For the same scenario, Figure 7 contains examples of relationship definitions of the MEO 
expressed in Subject-Predicate-Object form using Turtle Syntax of Semantic Web Standards. 
This form of MEO expression facilitates validation and queries for logical coherence. 
 
Figure 7. Examples of MEO Relationship Definitions Expressed in Turtle Syntax of Subject-Predicate-Object 
Triples 
 
4. Ontology Implementation 
Once the MEO of the mission order is validated, it is now ready for implementation in a 
mission for the assigned unmanned systems. Figure 8 is a graphical representation of the Sailor 





Figure 8. Ethical Control of Unmanned Systems in a Surrogate Scenario: Sailor Overboard Recovery Mission 
Defined Using the MEO Methodology 
 
Refer to the project website (link provided in Appendix A) for additional documentation 
of the result of this MEO confirmation using SPARQL. 
The next chapter presents applications of the MEO methodology in the design, 



























V. APPLICATION OF THE MEO METHODOLOGY 
Lifesaving missions—and missions accomplished with lethal force—are complementary 
in military operations. Human-robot activity can result in lethal or lifesaving outcomes. 
Continuing refinement and clarity in mission design are opening the path to repeatability, and 
hence a methodology for implementing ethical control of unmanned systems. This section 
discusses application of the Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) Loop decision paradigm to 
unmanned system mission design in order to harmonize unmanned system missions with human 
operations. 
 
A. ENABLING TECHNOLOGIES AND CONCEPTS 
Artificial Intelligence (AI), conceptual chunking (of information), and algorithm loop 
management are relevant in the development and design of missions for unmanned systems. 
1. Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
AI turns data into information for use by humans. AI systems do not have capacity for 
rational thought or morality. Unmanned systems require sophisticated control across time and 
space. A large and involved body of internationally accepted law comprises Law of Armed 
Conflict (LOAC), bounding Rules of Engagement (ROE). Only professional warfighters have 
moral capacity, legal culpability, and societal authority to direct actions applying lethal force. 
Humans must be able to trust that systems under their direction will do what they are told to do, 
and not do what they are forbidden to do.  
2. Conceptual Chunking 
Conceptual Chunking includes the following characteristics (“Chunking (psychology),” 
2020):  
• In cognitive psychology, chunking is a process by which individual pieces of an 
information set are broken down and then grouped together. 
• A chunk is a collection of basic familiar units that have been grouped together and 
stored in a person’s memory. These chunks are able to be retrieved more easily due to 
their coherent familiarity. 
• It is believed that individuals create higher order cognitive representations of the 
items within the chunk. The items are more easily remembered as a group than as the 
individual items themselves. 
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• These chunks can be highly subjective because they rely on an individual’s 
perceptions and past experiences that are able to be linked to the information set. The 
size of the chunks generally range anywhere from two to six items, but often differ 
based on language and culture. 
Design experience in this research has demonstrated Conceptual Chunking for mission 
design by grouping goal tasks within specific mission phases.  
3. Algorithm Loop Management 
Proper algorithms always include one or more termination conditions. A sequence of 
operations proceeds through a finite number of steps, otherwise the system is performing an 
infinite loop without end. Infinite-loop sequencing or unterminated recursion are common 
computational failure modes and must be protected against for reliable operations. Nevertheless, 
a frequent characteristic of at-sea operations is to perform repeated tasks in an interactive fashion 
until complete—either via task success or a terminating condition that forces halting of the 
process.  
The presence of termination conditions can be verified in mission logic and tested in 
simulation. Example terminating conditions, some fixed/adaptive, and some 
iterative/exceptional, are: 
• Reach maximum number of iterations 
• Point of diminishing returns (e.g., unchanging search effectiveness) 
• Time-out deadline reached, or else no longer feasible to continue 
• Insufficient power remains, conduct graceful shutdown for recovery 
• Equipment damage or unexpected software failure; log and shutdown 
• Interfering operational conditions (e.g., potential hazard to friendlies) 
• Human direction asserts higher priority and overrides decision logic 
A recommended future work is to express precisely in AVCL all termination conditions 
such as those listed above as constraints in MEO for algorithm loop management. 
 
B. MISSION ORDER DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS 
1. Mission Order Clarity 
Clarity is paramount when giving or receiving mission orders. It is especially important 
for human Commanders providing clear directions to Human-Machine teams. Commanders must 
avoid the danger of ambiguity, or even anthropomorphizing robots as human-like. Simplicity of 
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success, failure, and (rare) exception outcomes encourages well-defined tasks and unambiguous, 
measurable criteria for continuation. Furthermore, the following set of complementary questions 
applies as an incisive determination for clarity in Human-Machine missions: A wrong question 
to ask first when planning a tactical operation for a Human-Machine team is: “What are my 
robots doing out there?” Rather, the right question to ask first when planning a tactical operation 
would be: “What is my human-robot team doing out there?” Human-robot team missions first 
have to be understood! Indeed, robots complement humans, who must remain in charge 
throughout.  
There is an added benefit of mission order clarity: Mission orders that are clearly 
readable/runnable by humans and robots can be further composed and checked by Command and 
Control (C2) planning tools to test for group operational-space management, e.g., force 
movement coordination, avoid mutual interference, weapon engagement zone assignments, etc. 
2. Mission Order Validation 
Mission orders must be both clear and validatable prior to dissemination and execution. 
Clear mission orders in this context are understandable by humans and readable by unmanned 
systems. They are validatable as syntactically correct, having no typographic errors or gaps, and 
avoiding non-sequitur “Garbage In. Garbage Out” (GIGO). Clear mission orders are also 
validatable as semantically correct, having no prerequisite omissions or contradictions. For 
example, upon review of a mission order, a Tactical Action Officer (or Commanding Officer) 
validates the mission order when he/she can confidently say: “Yes, I understand and approve this 
human-robot mission”; or, equivalently: “Yes, I understand this mission and my team has the 
ability to carry it out themselves.” Conversely, if a mission order is organized and/or presented 
such that a Human Commander/Operator cannot fully review, understand, and/or approve such 
mission, then it is likely that the received mission order is ill-defined and needs further 
clarification anyway. 
3. Application of Conceptual Chunking for Mission Order Clarity and 
Validation 
Aspects of AVCL-represented mission orders are designed to support chunking for 
clarity. These AVCL attributes include a well-defined, structured vocabulary that can describe a 
hierarchy of distinct, familiar goals. This project shows that it is feasible to group (i.e., by 
chunking) mission goal tasks within specific mission phase definitions to achieve mission order 
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clarity. A recommended future work for applying conceptual chunking for mission order clarity 
is to demonstrate best practices for characterizing common mission phases in order to establish 
testable design patterns for mission orders as templates that aid operators in issuing clear and 
validatable mission orders. 
4. Mission Execution Decision Process: The “Observe-Orient-Decide-Act 
(OODA)” Loop 
With respect to mission order clarity, if the Human Commander/decision maker does not 
apply a decision model such as an OODA Loop, the Human Commander does not have a 
competent decision model through which to execute the assigned mission order, no matter the 
clarity and validity of the order. “The OODA loop is the cycle Observe–Orient–Decide–Act, 
developed by military strategist and USAF Colonel John Boyd. Boyd applied the concept to the 
combat operations process, often at the operational level during military campaigns. It is now 
also often applied to understand commercial operations and learning processes. The approach 
explains how agility can overcome raw power in dealing with human opponents.” (“OODA 
loop,” 2020) All effective purposeful military activity can be conceived in terms of the OODA 
Loop process, especially at tactical/operational levels. Based on its succinctness in describing the 
decision process, the MEO methodology aligns its mission design with the phases of the OODA 
Loop in order to ensure that unmanned systems will be able to emulate the decision process of 
the human operator/team member within the Human-Machine team. 
The reason for applying the OODA Loop in mission design for ethical control of 
unmanned systems is that the classical, robotic Sense-Decide-Act cycle for closed-loop control 
of unmanned systems is insufficient for proper delegation of lethal (or lifesaving) force to the 
unmanned systems. The OODA Loop decision model is essential for coherent operations in 
Human-Machine Teams.  
In the OODA Loop for unmanned systems, the Observe phase is the beginning of the 
decision process and includes direct sensing and communication inputs. The Orient phase 
includes thorough Rules of Engagement (ROE) constraints and IFFNU (identification, friend, 
foe, neutral, unknown) of all relevant contacts. The Decision phase implements the logic of 
unmanned system tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), including authorization and 
confirmation by human supervisors, either in real-time or in advance (pre-planned and/or stored 
in memory), for critical decision steps leading to use of lethal force. The Act phase is 
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implemented in tandem with direct or intermittent human supervisory commands that enable 
effective Ethical Control of remote systems. The process repeats as the unmanned system 
observes and senses the impact of its actions. This feedback loop is essential for decision making 
and refinement, and generally leading to, without surprise, more effective military operations. 
Therefore, unmanned system activity must complement, not contradict, human decision 
processes such as the OODA Loop paradigm. 
5. Mission Order Coherence 
Application of ROE and LOAC requirements in MEO may be a part of the Mission 
Definition step of the MEO methodology (described in Section III.B.4), where relationships and 
requirements for mission execution are defined. For example, typically, an ROE requirement 
may be represented as Goal success/failure criteria, preset authorities, or time-outs for 
delegation, etc., and as Constraints on mission conduct, e.g., safe zones, permission 
periods/requirements, etc. When human Commanders confirm correct inclusion of ROE 
requirements in mission orders, they essentially perform an audit of doctrine and TTPs. Similar 
audit confirmation can be applied to well-structured orders. As previously mentioned in Section 
III.C.5, AVCL has demonstrated that it can be used to develop and express well-defined mission 
goals for unmanned systems. The mission analyst can then perform SPARQL queries of the 
MEO for logic-confirmation checks. The resulting mission orders are thus coherent from the 
OODA perspective. 
6. Tactical Span of Control 
Span of control is number of subordinates reporting to a supervisor. In effect, multiple 
offboard unmanned systems supervised by a ship comprise its span of control across the tactical 
battlespace. Tactical span of control is required for any Commander who commands 
subordinates. Greater tactical presence across distances of time and space means the ship 
commanders have greater ability to influence their assigned area of operation. Clear mission 
guidance on human-checkpoint requirements reduces dependency on communication links (i.e., 
Network Optional Warfare). Figure 9 illustrates how such increased ability to project power 
enables the ship to maintain chosen standoff location while focusing direct attention and actions 
in multiple locations at once. 
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Figure 9. Example Scenario of Ethical Conundrum for Unmanned System Mission Execution. 
 
C. CANONICAL MISSION SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT 
Unmanned systems working in tandem with human forces, authorized by the commander 
for lifesaving or lethal force, can handle progressive challenges in distance and time. This 
research project has developed four categories of mission scenarios in progressive sophistication 
to test and evaluate Ethical Control design: 
1. Basic: Show flow-logic of ternary control in a simple, real-time scenario. 
2. Intermediate: Adds looping logic and long-time duration activity at long-distance but 
with real-time communication. 
3. Advanced: Adds long duration with possible loss of communication. 
4. Operational Standard: Encounters deceptive and unconventional adversary and 
responds with proportional force.  
Each category has an exemplar mission from representative Naval operations. The 
missions themselves are carefully crafted in a narrow sense in order to illustrate and test specific 
characteristics of the Ethical Control methodology. These exemplar missions form the set of 
canonical missions for this study: 
Exemplar Mission A: Sailor Overboard. The Unmanned System is assigned to apply 
lifesaving force under close coordination to recover the sailor. 
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Exemplar Mission B: Lifeboat Tracking. The Unmanned System is tasked to apply 
lifesaving force to search and track lifeboats at long distance from the Human 
Commander. 
Exemplar Mission C: Pirate Boats Attack. The Unmanned System equipped with 
lifesaving and lethal force is assigned to overtake a pirate small-boat gang attempting to 
capture a threatened evading merchant ship in order to protect the merchant ship. The 
Unmanned System must operate over a long time period for the mission, emphasizing 
restraint throughout.  
Exemplar Mission D: Hospital Ship EM Decoy. The Unmanned System equipped with 
lifesaving and lethal force is assigned to patrol the perimeter of the task force and 
encounters a deceptive and unconventional adversary. For comparison, two variations 
show the fundamental importance of ethical constraints on mission execution.   
• Sense-Decide-Act Loop. This commonplace pathology illustrates lack of ethical 
control. Adversary exploits the Unmanned System’s rudimentary Sense-Decide-Act 
capabilities as vulnerabilities, and provokes it to immediately react with a 
counterattack on a False-Flagged Hospital Ship. 
• Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) Loop. This scenario demonstrates that addition 
of ethical control to Sense-Decide-Act overcomes limitations of independent machine 
response, and indeed leads to more effective warfighting. OODA Loop tactics and 
Ethical Control constraints prevent automatic erroneous counterattack against false 
flag placed on friendly ship, and thus improves defense. Human confirmation of the 
Unmanned System’s Identification Friend, Foe, Neutral, or Unknown (IFFNU) 
classification result to detect spoofing anti-pattern, and authorization for the 
Unmanned System to apply lethal force prior to use, prevents reflexive automatic 
counterattack and accelerates defense of the force. 
A range of functionality that tests the majority of Ethical Control capabilities currently 
envisioned has been demonstrated in this project. These canonical mission capabilities also set 
the stage for further research in missions and scenarios of interest, e.g., Human-Machine Teams 
in a Counter-Swarming mission. 
Completing this initial set of canonical missions demonstrates both logical soundness and 
human comprehensibility of the Ethical Control methodology, for both lifesaving and lethal 
force. This initial set of missions “tuned up” the AVCL vocabulary for mission orders, revealing 
good practices and repeatable design patterns for common activities in diverse missions. The 
AVCL representations of various mission orders are subsequently translated into corresponding 
Semantic Web Standards ontology representations in order to perform semantic validation of 
correctness of ethical constraints. Then, using the AVCL representation of the mission orders, 
simulation of the mission is performed in the AUV Workbench tool to show that the mission 
executes in simulation, or else reveals hidden flaws.  
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Table 2 summarizes the five canonical missions and the tasks the unmanned systems 
would need to perform in each phase of the OODA Loop. 
Table 2. Tasks Assigned to Unmanned Systems in Each Phase of the OODA Loop  




Observe Orient Decide  Act 
Sailor Overboard Find Sailor Report status Avoid interference Track sailor until rescued or 
relieved 
Lifeboat Tracking Find lifeboat Report status Two-way 
communication 




ship, pirate small 
boats 




• Issue warnings 
Human commander 
authorization to use 
lethal force 
Attack to defend ship if 
provoked, stay with 
merchant 
Hospital Ship EM 
Decoy: Sense-
Decide-Act Loop 







Mistaken attack on friendly 
or neutral forces equals a 
war crime 
Hospital Ship EM 
Decoy: OODA 
Loop 





for lethal force 
unmet, attack 
avoided 
Report threat alert, 
commence search for 
hostile actors  
 
Based on the research accomplished in this project, a recommended future work is to 
prepare and develop comprehensive testing of unmanned systems mission orders across the 
range of assigned mission requirements that constitute the operational qualification process for 
the unmanned system. By applying the MEO methodology in the aforementioned scenarios, a 
scale for qualifying unmanned systems for performing missions under Ethical Control emerges: 
Level 1: Basic. Qualified to apply lifesaving force under close coordination with the 
Human Commander, e.g., Sailor Overboard Recovery mission. 
Level 2: Intermediate. Qualified to apply lifesaving force at long distance from the 
Human Commander, e.g., Search and Rescue mission. 
Level 3: Advanced. Qualified to apply organic lifesaving/lethal force over long time 
periods for the mission, emphasizing restraint throughout, e.g., Counter-Piracy mission.  
Level 4: Operational Standard. Qualified to apply organic lifesaving/lethal force in 
contested/deceptive environments, e.g., Force Protection mission. Uses human 
confirmation of Identification Friend, Foe, Neutral, or Unknown (IFFNU) classification 
result to detect spoofing anti-pattern, with authorization required to apply lethal force, 
prevent reflexive automatic counterattack response, and engage with proportional force.  
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Each of the four canonical missions has the following structure: 
a. Design and Description 
b. Mission Decision-Flow Diagram 
c. AVCL implementation source: version control, XML Spy table 
d. Semantic Web Mission MEO .ttl Turtle representation 
e. SPARQL semantic queries 
f. Lisp and Prolog autocode 
g. AUV Workbench simulation 
 
1. Basic Mission for Unmanned Systems: Sailor Overboard for Lifesaving 
Force under Close Coordination 
The scenario is a single unmanned air/surface vehicle performing lifesaving actions to 
complement human responses during “Sailor Overboard” recovery operations. Robot actions are 
carried out in direct concert with formal shipboard emergency procedures. Multiple Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs) might be employed in parallel 
with ships and aircraft, and must avoid mutual interference by each following de-conflicted 
mission orders. The Phases of mission are: Deploy/Launch, Rendezvous, Track Sailor until Safe, 
and Return/Recovery. The Human Supervisory Role is to order the responding unmanned 
systems to standoff should they become interfering, and possibly take manual control due to 
proximity. Rescuers can communicate to the sailor overboard via loudspeaker or beacon light. 
a. Design and Description 
This scenario is used to show that mission design can complement shipboard 
procedures. The scenario explores how lifesaving force is complementary to lethal force, with 
many similar considerations for remote supervision. This scenario is the first one studied in this 
project in order to demonstrate human-system teaming in close proximity to the ship in 
command, where direct override of robot control by human operator is possible. There would be 
no temporal delays in mission execution—all actions and reactions must be immediate. These 
operational requirements form the basic level of ethical control and constraints on the unmanned 
system.  
 30 
b. Mission Decision-Flow Diagram 
Figure 10 is the Mission Decision-Flow Diagram for the Sailor Overboard 
mission. 
 
Figure 10. Sailor Overboard Mission Decision-Flow Diagram 
  
A lesson learned from implementing the MEO methodology for this scenario is the need 
for good mission design patterns that visually represent the AVCL mission satisfactorily, and 
diagramming missions into decision phases using a temporal flow representation (left to right, 
e.g., Gantt chart). Hence, the Mission Decision-Flow diagram is an important step in the analysis 
of the mission in a particular scenario. 
c. AVCL Implementation Source: Version Control, XML Spy Table 
The AVCL representation of the Unmanned Systems’ mission order for this 
scenario may be reviewed here: 
https://gitlab.nps.edu/Savage/EthicalControl/blob/master/missions/avcl/SailorOverboard.xml 
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d. Semantic Web Mission MEO .ttl Turtle representation 
The Semantic Web Standards in Terse RDF Triple (.ttl) format of the MEO for 
the scenario may be reviewed here: https://gitlab.nps.edu/Savage/EthicalControl/-
/blob/master/ontologies/MissionExecutionOntology3.0.ttl 
e. SPARQL Semantic Queries 




f. Lisp and Prolog Autocode 
The query results in Lisp and Prolog form may be reviewed here: 
https://gitlab.nps.edu/Savage/EthicalControl/-
/blob/master/queries/SailorOverboardConverted.MissionQuery_01_GoalBranches.rq.txt 
g. AUV Workbench Simulation 
Figure 11 is a screenshot of the graphical layout of the simulation of the scenario 
in the simulation environment in the AUV Workbench tool. 
 
 
Figure 11. Sailor Overboard Mission Scenario as Simulated Using AUV Workbench (AUVW) 
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For brevity, this report presents the Mission Design and Description, as well as the 
Mission Decision-Flow Diagram for each of the subsequent scenarios. The NPS project website 
contains the MEO in AVCL, the Semantic Web SPARQL queries for confirmation and 
validation and the respective results, as well as the AUV Workbench simulation. These results 
for all missions are posted here: https://gitlab.nps.edu/Savage/EthicalControl/-/tree/master  
2. Intermediate Mission: Lifeboat Tracking and Lifesaving Force Application 
under Remote Condition 
This mission is similar to Sailor Overboard in demonstrating use of lifesaving force, but 
with far greater distances, over the horizon, and increases the ship Commander’s tactical span of 
control. Potential for intermittent or lost communications in real time requires advance guidance 
for default behaviors desired by the human controller. Consideration of possible transfer of 
supervisory control mid-mission to another cooperating vessel appears feasible. The lessons 
learned from this scenario include Vertical grouping of related subtasks in a mission phase helps 
in structuring mission goal sets, without requiring a change to the ternary logic of AVCL mission 
goals. Also, coexistence of multiple constraints is possible, but requires careful thought to design 
and implement. 
a. Design and Description 
The mission for the unmanned system in this scenario is to provide remote 
presence for locating, tracking, communicating, and beaconing. The mission Phases are: 
Deploy/Launch, Rendezvous, Track Lifeboat, Beacon/Communicate, and Return/Recovery. The 
Human Supervisory Role and Constraints are to monitor, communicate, respond or coordinate 
rescue effort. Considerations for a low fuel condition and graceful-degradation response are 
included in the MEO. The mission presents an intermediate level of ethical challenge for the 
unmanned system and the Human operator due to the increased physical distance and tactical 
span of control.  
b. Mission Decision-Flow Diagram 
Figure 12 is the Mission Decision-Flow Diagram for this mission. 
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Figure 12. Decision-Flow Diagram for Lifeboat Tracking Mission 
 
3. Advanced Mission: Deter Pirate Boats Seizing Merchant Ship with Ability 
for Steady Escalation to Lethal Force  
The motivations for the design of this mission are the necessity to apply lethal force 
against pirates distant from ownship, and corresponding lifesaving force potential for the hostage 
merchant crew. In the scenario, unmanned systems must operate over a long time period, 
emphasizing restraint throughout. Additionally, supervisory checkpoints for human operator 
control of the unmanned systems are soft and strict. The lessons learned from this scenario 
include the concept of phases helps organize overall mission structure sensibly (e.g., approach, 
warning, attack, recovery). Additionally, decision looping is necessary, with human control as 
checkpoints to help avoid deadlock (i.e., algorithm loop management). 
a. Design and Description 
The unmanned systems’ mission in this scenario is to overtake a pirate small-boat 
gang attempting to capture a threatened evading merchant ship. The mission has the following 
phases: Deploy/Launch, Search, Approach and Track, Warning, and Attack. For Human 
Supervisory Role and Constraints, the Human Commander controls the pace of engagement, and 
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the role of careful, deliberate escalation in the use of force. The Human Commander/Operator 
must also confirm IFFNU classification, and must order lethal force prior to use. The scenario 
includes a low-fuel condition for the unmanned system and consequent graceful-degradation 
response for realism. Additionally, the scenario presents an ethical conundrum for the Human-
Machine Team with low ammunition condition in the Unmanned Systems, with consideration for 
the team to assign the Unmanned Systems to fight to the finish, or stand in reserve.  
b. Mission Decision-Flow Diagrams 
Figures 13 through 15 are the Mission Decision-Flow Diagrams for the counter-
piracy scenario covering the Approach, Escalation, and Counterattack phases of the mission. 
 
 




Figure 14. Decision-Flow Diagram for Escalation Phases of the Pirate Boats Attack Mission 
 
 
Figure 15. Decision-Flow Diagram for Counterattack Phase of Pirate Boats Attack Mission 
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This Counter-Piracy scenario presents an advanced challenge for the Human-Machine 
Team, as it adds criteria for the unmanned system to use lethal force in order to achieve its 
assigned mission. However, while the scenario is considered advanced for an unmanned system 
to perform, the scenario does not include the very real possibility of operations in an 
environment that is denied, degraded, and even deceptive, due to an adversary’s actions. Having 
unmanned systems capable of maintain ethical control in such an environment is the operational 
standard, and so the next scenario is developed. 
 
4. Operational Standard for Ethical Control of Unmanned Systems: Respond to 
Hospital Ship EM Decoy with Proportional Force 
This scenario highlights that simplistic Sense-Decide-Act responses of unmanned 
systems in the Human-Machine Team are exploitable easily by an adversary. Failure to operate 
with ethical control in this scenario results in blue-on-blue damage, self-inflicted war crime, and 
likely stand-down of all unmanned systems. In this scenario, two unmanned systems mission 
operations methods are used for comparison—one with and one without ethical control. 
Comparison with OODA Loop principles ensures that human-robot teamed operations are well 
understood and tactically effective. 
a. Design and Description 
The purpose of this mission is for comparison. Immediate reaction by a robot 
swarm using only the Sense-Decide-Act cycle results in unintended blue-on-blue war crime. 
Ethical Control constraints (OODA Loop and using IFFNU for correlation) prevent automatic 
counterattack and accelerate defense. The Phases of the mission are: Set response thresholds, 
detect threat, and counterattack ship or threat. For this mission, the Human Supervisory Role is: 
Confirm IFFNU classification and must permit lethal force prior to use. 
b. Mission Decision-Flow Diagram 
Since the adversary “gets a vote” in the decision process in the real world, this 
scenario incorporates the adversary’s decision flow. Figure 16 is the Adversary’s decision-flow 
diagram to deceive and exploit the Friendly Human-Machine Team. 
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Figure 16. Adversary’s Decision-Flow Diagram for Hospital Ship EM Decoy Mission 
 
 Figure 17 presents a comparison of ethically controlled responses of the unmanned 
systems in this scenario. The decision-flow diagram in the top half of the figure shows the 
possibility and consequence of a reflexive response by the unmanned system. Were the 
unmanned system to execute the mission based on “Sense-Decide-Act” decision flow—i.e., the 
unmanned system is equipped with a simplistic “Orient” phase that performs little to no IFFNU 
processing—it would be deceived into responding in such a way that ultimately results in blue-
on-blue engagements. Conversely, the operational standard for ethically controlled unmanned 
system mission execution is shown in the bottom half of the figure. The incorporation of 
additional and/or advanced IFFNU and confirmation actions in the “Orient” phase in the 
unmanned system’s decision algorithms contributes to successful mission accomplishment that is 
compliant with ethical constraints. 
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Figure 17. Decision-Flow Comparison between Mission Orders with and without Robust OODA Loop 
Paradigm in Hospital Ship EM Decoy Mission 
 
There is historical context for “false flag” scenarios and similar applications of 
operational deception in maritime operations where a contact appears friendly or neutral, or even 
suspicious, but in reality has hostile intent and is ready to engage in a hostile act. The USS 
COLE bombing on 12 October 2000 in Yemen is an example of such a deceptive suicide attack 
by al-Qaeda terrorists, who disguised a small boat laden with explosives for a suicide attack on 
the COLE. Furthermore, the Rules of Engagement for the crew of the COLE hindered her 
response to the approaching suspicious small boat.  
Real-world operations and scenarios in which Command and Control in a Denied or 
Degraded [or Deceptive, as this research has studied] Environment (C2D2E) are essential, have 
contributed to increasing considerations for applications of unmanned systems and Human-
Machine Teams (Chief of Naval Operations, 2019; see also “Network Optional Warfare,” 2020). 
Therefore, it is paramount that an unmanned system with lethal effects be capable of operating 
and maintaining within ethical control as defined in its mission while it performs its assigned 
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mission in scenarios similar to this one. A rigorous qualification process of unmanned systems 
with lethal effects for operations in this type of environment is thus recommended. 
 
D. ITERATION FOR REFINEMENT 
The MEO methodology adopts many SecDevOps practices (Miller 2019) to support 
iterative improvement. Consequently, several new AVCL mission goal types are developed. 
The current mission-goal vocabulary seems sufficient for most tasks considered. Prior 
work consolidated 12 goal types from multiple data models. For example, the AVCL goal task of 
SampleEnvironment is awkwardly phrased when applied to scanning for vessels. Another AVCL 
goal task, MonitorTransmissions, needs to distinguish transmit and/or receive. Additional goal 
categories can help establish good design patterns for tasks. Precise definitions of AVCL 
configuration settings for missions also need improvement. A checkpoint will help to clarify 
decision branching, including via external communication. Additionally, if algorithm loop 
branching is enabled, termination conditions must be provided in order to avoid infinite loop or 
deadlock conditions. 
The current AVCL version, AVCL3, has mission designs that descriptively apply 
existing goal types, and confirms that these further types are indeed necessary. 
Demonstrations of the MEO methodology are now needed for all missions. In addition to 
AVCL representations of the respective mission orders, the demonstration needs to include 
Semantic Web ethical validation for proven capability and adding depth/breadth. AUV 
Workbench simulation confirmation is also advancing steadily.  
With the aforementioned additions and improvements, and with simulated evidence of 
correctness for all exemplar missions, the MEO methodology for ethical control of unmanned 
systems is now grounded at a higher Technical Readiness Level (TRL) than before the project 
began. These considerations and recommendations for future work are discussed in Chapters 7 

































VI. ENABLING TECHNOLOGIES TO OPERATIONALIZE MEO FOR 
ETHICAL CONTROL OF UNMANNED SYSTEMS 
This chapter discusses some technologies that can be used to operationalize ethical 
control in real-world military operations—specifically, technologies that assure secure and 
trusted communication of mission orders in the end-to-end command and control process 
between the Human-Machine Team. These enabling technologies together comprise Data-
Centric Security, which incorporates technologies for Compression, Authentication, Encryption, 
Composability, Blockchain Ledger, and Asymmetric Advantages to enable group 
communication of secure mission orders and responses. Additionally, technologies in 
Programming Languages enable interoperability; furthermore, simulation and visualization 
techniques are relevant for validation and qualification of MEOs. AI/ML is again discussed with 
respect to relevance in ethical control of unmanned systems.  
 
A. DATA-CENTRIC SECURITY 
Data-Centric Security provides a Chain of Trust for distributed Command Authority. This 
Chain of Trust for the security of data consists of Data Structure, Data Compression, Efficient 
Messaging, Digital Signature, and Encryption. Furthermore, Extensible Markup Language 
(XML) is used for security of data in order to accomplish this Chain of Trust. 
1. XML Security for Data 
a. Data Structure 
XML provides formal structure for data models and information exchange. “XML 
is a markup language that defines a set of rules for encoding documents in a format that is both 
human-readable and machine-readable (“XML,” 2020). XML provides declarative and self-
describing data structures, not program source code. Data validation through XML schema 
includes strong typing of values and correct parent-child hierarchical relationships. This avoids 
GIGO pathologies when communicating between multiple systems and across related protocols. 
Similarly applicable are data structures using JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) and other 
formats. XML offers complete precision of expressive power when defining human orders and 
system responses, e.g., via AVCL. 
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b. Data Compression 
Efficient XML Interchange (EXI) provides best-possible compression of XML 
documents, reducing size and speeding up decompression. There have been years of work by an 
exceptionally competent working group, with proven results. EXI has recommendations by the 
World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), with multiple open-source and commercial 
implementations in Java and C++. EXI preserves sufficient structure for lossless composition of 
compressed XML. Thus, even signed and encrypted data documents shown in this work can get 
best-proven compression for use on limited, disadvantaged and challenged communications links 
facing deployed Naval forces. 
c. XML-Enabled Efficient Messaging 
“Efficiency” for smaller data size and computationally simpler loading is 
compatible with Data-Centric Security. Demonstrated thesis work has shown that digital 
signature (for authentication) and XML Encryption (privacy and access control) can coexist with 
efficient compression, when applied in the correct order. Such interoperability for Information 
Assurance (IA) is necessary when working with coalition partners, as well as for safeguarding 
data within deployed unmanned systems that are beyond the reach of network-centric security. 
Navy networks afloat are very different than networks ashore. Bandwidth is a precious 
and finite resource, latency can be huge, connectivity can be intermittent, environmental effects 
dominate, channels are limited in varying ways, and mobile relays are rare. Manned and 
unmanned Naval systems need efficient messaging for networks afloat—but rarely have it. 
Failing to properly utilize communications capacity directly limits tactical effectiveness. 
Efficient messaging is needed to take maximum advantage of severely constrained data 
links. The key to our strategies for achieving efficient messaging is first to use XML for 
structured data languages, and then use EXI for compressing XML. Since XML provides a 
flexible and validatable way to define regular data structures for any language, it provides a 
practical opportunity to compatibly capture and convert all manner of diverse data formats used 
for military messaging. The economics of Web technologies are undeniable and usually provide 
industry-wide best practices as well. As a result, this use of open standards is scalable and 
repeatable, avoiding the “stovepipes” which commonly prevent system-wide interoperability 
between Navy platforms and coalition partners. 
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“Efficiency” means both size and speed. EXI has demonstrated compaction that always 
meets or beats the most commonly used compression techniques (zip and gzip). Additionally, 
because EXI decompression goes straight into memory rather than string characters, which then 
require significant additional parsing, decoding EXI is many times faster than other techniques. 
This approach also reduces memory requirements and power consumption on small devices. 
Because Navy tactical traffic is usually highly structured and highly numeric, EXI provides 
major advantages that might well impact all afloat Navy communications. Alternative bit-centric 
compression schemes cannot take full advantage of those characteristics. 
d. Digital Signature 
XML Digital Signature (DS) defines XML syntax for digital signatures 
promulgated as a W3C Recommendation, stable since 2013, with international adoption 
(https://www.w3.org/TR/xmldsig-core1). Public-private key pairs for signature/authentication 
and key distribution are separate. The technique is applicable to entire documents or to fragments 
(subsections). DS requires XML Canonicalization of input documents to regularize formatting so 
that identical documents are uniquely expressed. DS can sign any data resource for identity 
verification, and non-repudiability for confirmation that original information has not been 
tampered with, etc. DS is completely compatible for data handling within trusted networks. In 
2019, NPS adapted an open-source Java version of Apache Santuario as utility classes and test 
suite for XML Security capabilities (“Apache SantuarioTM,” 2020). Prior project examples of 
XML Encryption and XML Digital Signature from years ago still work.  
e. Encryption 
XML Encryption (XML-Enc) defines how to encrypt XML data. It is available as 
a W3C Recommendation, stable since 2013, with international adoption 
(https://www.w3.org/TR/xmlenc-core1). Public-private (i.e., shared-secret) key pairs and key 
distribution are separate. XML Encryption is applicable to entire documents or to fragments 
(subsections). It is different from Transport Layer Security (TLS), which is used by http/https for 
sending encrypted traffic over the Internet. Some vulnerabilities were reported publicly, but each 
was performed via exhaustive attacks against the server, incrementally analyzing error responses. 
It is not a likely or practical mode of attack against unmanned systems. XML-Enc is completely 
compatible for data handling within already-trusted networks, providing additional security for 
data at rest or data collected in deployed unmanned systems. 
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f. XML-Enabled Secure Data Composition 
EXI Compression, XML Digital Signature, and XML Encryption can be 
composed for applying to data in single files/documents/messages. Each technology works on 
data formatted as valid XML. Multiple NPS theses have examined EXI characteristics in 
combination with XML Security. Such composition is partially demonstrated and appears 
completely feasible. An example of this composition is in Document-based Message-centric 
Security using XML Authentication and Encryption for Coalition and Interagency Operations 
(Williams, 2009). Each technique is usable in concert for Data-Centric Security, compatibly 
within any secure network or within fixed/mobile data storage of unmanned systems. Figure 18 
depicts the Chain of security for data using XML composition. 
 
 
Figure 18. Composition of EXI Compression, XML Digital Signature, and XML Encryption as 
Recommended Best Practice for Secure and Efficient Messaging of Mission Orders to Unmanned Systems 
 
g. Operationalization 
Data-Centric Security that includes authentication of ordered missions for 
unmanned systems provides a military, legal, ethical and moral basis for non-repudiability and 
accountability of human commanders. Authorized humans remain in charge, accountable for 
robot actions. Collected robot data is encrypted in asymmetric manner, greatly reducing 
vulnerabilities following any robot capture or compromise. Data-Centric Security can coexist 
within all levels of network security. Such reliability provides an excellent rationale to link Data-
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Centric Security to design considerations for Ethical Control, compatibly across all networks. 
Once again, Ethical Control leads to more-effective warfighting. 
2. Blockchain Distributed Ledger 
“A distributed ledger is a consensus of replicated, shared, and synchronized digital data 
geographically spread across multiple sites, countries, or institutions. There is no central 
administrator or centralized data storage” (“Distributed ledger,” 2020). Design characteristics of 
a distributed ledger can be tuned to match system needs and include strict sequencing of ledger 
entries, non-repudiability of message sequences, consensus algorithm (proof of work or stake), 
etc. Implementation is often accomplished via a blockchain system.  Characteristics of interest 
follow. 
a. Application of Blockchain Distributed Ledger for Mission Orders 
Significant protections of mission order data from hostile takeover are possible for 
deployed friendly-force robots.  
Accountability for actions requires a traceable, provable decision tree. 
The following vulnerability “anti-pattern” provides an interesting use case, whereby non-
repudiability of mission orders can prevent an opponent from falsely claiming a “rogue robot” or 
“rogue commander” scenario: 
Opponent captures control of a friendly unmanned system (physically or through 
cyber attack). Opponent has no key, and is unable to decrypt previously recorded 
sensor data. Opponent disables onboard security interlocks, directs unmanned 
system to execute hostile act (e.g., attack on friendly or neutral force). Post-
incident investigation reveals and proves that mission orders were not 
authenticated or authorized by original friendly commander. Blockchain ledger of 
all issued authenticated orders reveals that no gaps occurred in shipboard records 
of approved missions. 
Based on the results of this project and prior research, as well as the scenario described 
above, a concept of operation for Data-Centric Security to enable ethical control of unmanned 
systems is for ships, aircraft and ground systems to maintain a strong distributed ledger of all 
XML-enabled secure messages sent and received. This process will reduce the risk of spoofing 
or counterfeit messages compromising unmanned systems. The development of this concept is a 
recommended future work as an extension to this project. 
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b. Blockchain Ledger for Distributed Accountability 
Given a trusted chain of message exchange among participating human 
commands and distributed systems, there are additional vulnerabilities that still need to be 
considered. Blockchain technology is relevant. An obvious tactical accountability issue is 
missing gaps or jammed messages. Failure to receive even one message (perhaps requiring 
human permissions) can invalidate any subsequent actions, thereby resulting in an effective loss 
of control of lethal force. Extrapolation of further needs includes investigation and improvement 
of all aspects required for after-action analysis. Having a ledger of all received/sent messages can 
provide accountability and verifiable chain of trust for authoritative reconstruction and progress. 
Important future work includes a custom blockchain providing assurances that scale among 
diverse participants and over time, without needing a central hub. 
3. Data-Centric Security and Command Authority 
The aforementioned assertion is re-emphasized: Data-Centric Security that includes 
authentication of ordered missions for unmanned systems provides a military, legal, ethical and 
moral basis for non-repudiability and accountability of human commanders. Authorized humans 
remain in charge, accountable for robot actions. Collected robot data is encrypted in asymmetric 
manner, greatly reducing vulnerabilities following any robot capture or compromise. Data-
Centric Security can coexist within all levels of network security. Such reliability provides 
excellent rationale to link Data-Centric Security to design considerations for Ethical Control, 
compatibly across all networks. Once again, Ethical Control leads to more-effective warfighting. 
a. Trust 
In the context of human-machine teaming for Naval operations, the chain of trust 
of the mission orders originates from the Human Commander to the Unmanned Systems in 
hostile environments, in which communication between friendly forces is denied and/or 
degraded. As the Human Commander of Unmanned Systems expects mission execution as 
ordered; the unmanned system would need authentic, uncompromised mission orders. This 
research describes Trust imparted in this context as Trusted Mission Orders and Trusted Mission 
Execution. 
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b. Trusted Mission Orders 
Characteristics of Trusted Mission Orders include:  
• Formal shared meaning between robots and human commanders 
• Controlled vocabulary of terms with well-defined conditions and 
outcomes 
• Syntax validation, well-formed data 
• Numerical validation, in bounds 
• Semantic confirmation of tactical prerequisites, coordination steps 
• No logical contradictions present 
c. Trusted Mission Execution 
Trusted Mission Execution has the following characteristics:  
• Portable tasking across diverse unmanned systems, C4I networks 
• Data-centric encryption for transmission across any network 
• Digital-signature authentication that confirms command identity 
• Blockchain ledger authoritatively confirms completeness, no gaps 
• Testable in simulation, eventually formalized as robot qualification   
4. Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) 
“Zero trust refers to an evolving set of network security paradigms that narrows defenses 
from wide network perimeters to individual resources. Its focus on protecting resources rather 
than network segments is a response to enterprise trends that include remote users and cloud-
based assets that are not located within an enterprise-owned network boundary.” (Rose, et al., 
2020). ZTA is relevant to Data-Centric Security, as it seems like a logical conclusion of such an 
approach to network security in a denied/degraded environment. 
 
B. MULTIPLE PROGRAMMING LANGUAGES 
Ethical control of unmanned systems should have the qualities of interoperability and 
modular open system architecture. Interoperability of MEO across programming languages is 
foundational. Current missions are available in multiple data forms and programming languages, 
together maintained in version control in the following website:  
https://gitlab.nps.edu/Savage/EthicalControl/tree/master/missions  
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1. Autonomous Vehicle Control Language (AVCL) 
AVCL mission parsers using multiple programming languages have been demonstrated 
to show that Ethical Control can be supported by any unmanned system. Implementing AVCL 
mission parsers in multiple programming languages encourages potential deployment of Ethical 
Control across many robots. 
2. Java for AUV Workbench 
The NPS AUV Workbench is implemented in Java. AUV Workbench is experimental 
open-source software that supports physics-based mission rehearsal, real-time task-level control 
of robot missions, and replay of recorded results in support of autonomous unmanned 
underwater, surface and air vehicles. AUV Workbench encompasses multiple Java-based 
simulation programs that can parse and execute AVCL missions with controllers getting 
feedback from a high-fidelity 6 degrees of freedom (6-DOF) hydrodynamics model. The Java 
custom library parses AVCL XML directly without requiring any further conversion; it also 
validates mission correctness. A recommended action for future work includes extracting a 
simple standalone AVCL parser for general Java use. 
3. Extensible Stylesheet Language for Transformations (XSLT) 
This project uses XSLT for mission conversion via multiple “AvclToLanguage” 
stylesheets. XSLT is an XML-based language used for transforming XML documents into other 
text-based forms (for example, transforming AVCL XML into a variety of alternatives, such as 
RDF/OWL). XSLT does not change the original document while producing a new one. It takes 
advantage of strictly defined vocabularies and well-validated structure. Additionally, XSLT is an 
open standard recommended by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C). It is well-suited for 
diverse conversion tasks. 
4. Lisp 
Lisp is a functional programming language for AI research. This project uses Lisp 
programming for AVCL mission logic implementation and conversion. AvclToLisp.xslt 
stylesheet reads AVCL XML to produce Lisp source code. The initial section provides the 
Mission Execution Engine (MEE) goal-traversal algorithm. The next section allows operator 
testing of mission-goal decision tree logic. The Sailor Overboard mission includes example 
operator test sequences. Lisp enables a simple test routine that shows how to run all possible 
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choice sequences. Recommended Future work includes automating exhaustive testing of all 
choices in all missions as an initial exemplar for exhaustive verification of mission logic. 
5. Prolog for Logic Conversions of AVCL Missions 
The ANSI Prolog is a logic programming language associated with AI research and 
computational linguistics. AvclToProlog.xslt stylesheet reads AVCL XML to produce Prolog 
source code. The initial section is the Mission Execution Engine (MEE) goal-traversal algorithm. 
The next section allows operator testing of mission-goal decision tree logic. The MEE holds 
common code for the Sailor Overboard mission accompanied by a console log of example 
operator test sequences. Future work includes developing a test routine showing how to build all 
possible choice sequences and automating exhaustive testing of all choices in all missions as an 
initial exemplar for exhaustive verification of mission logic. 
6. “Your Programming Language Here”: An Ecosystem of Rigorous Parsers 
Robot software tends to be highly specialized, idiosyncratic, and evolving. Despite rapid 
change, programmers want library reuse and flexible repeatability. The Robot Operating System 
(ROS) is steadily gaining usage with a hardened ROS-Military (ROS-M) version available. 
Creating a family of AVCL parsers that can read XML-based missions opens the door to 
interoperability and shared support. Automating the production of these parsers from the AVCL 
schema ensures that all systems can have rigorous and consistent support. Individual robot logic 
may vary widely in implementation details, but core semantics of AVCL goals and nomenclature 
remain well defined. Future work includes establishing qualification testing for software or 
hardware running “in the loop” that can confirm individual robots are operating safely and with 
abilities to follow AVCL missions. 
 
C. SIMULATION AND VISUALIZATION FOR VALIDATION AND 
QUALIFICATION OF MISSION EXECUTION ONTOLOGIES 
Rehearsal, real-time runs and replay are possible using AVCL constructs across multiple 
representations and programming languages. This is a path towards achieving interoperability. 
This section discusses considerations in applying simulation and visualization for validation and 
qualification of MEO. 
Robotic systems tend to be complex codebases with implementations that require strict, 
idiosyncratic, language-specific programming logic. In general, system designers can say, “Here 
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are the requirements.” Also, in general, programmers can say, “Here’s how we wrote that code.” 
However, these assertions are not the same—they often do not even share the same terms of 
reference! Traceable predictability of software logic is difficult and not portable across systems. 
Nevertheless, confirming code capabilities is testable and repeatable across systems. This is the 
key point: strict validation of mission syntax and semantics are both possible! Patterns of 
implementation then become demonstrable in different systems. Human confirmation of mission 
definitions remains central throughout. 
1. Scalability of Simulation and Visualization Technologies and Environments 
MEO simulation and visualization would need multiple implementations for scalability. 
Given the broad diversity of robotic software and hardware systems under development, no 
single reference codebase is either possible or desirable. Nevertheless, systems can easily parse 
and utilize well-defined data (orders). Focusing on formal mission definition for both humans 
and systems provides a testable middle ground that each can use effectively. Implementing and 
evaluating using multiple software implementations also provides strong evidence that design 
capabilities all work as planned. In turn, they produce corresponding worklists of needed 
improvements, to help both mission-design clarity and software-implementation correctness. 
This project uses multiple programming paths in tandem, in order to demonstrate that multiple 
kinds of unmanned systems can adopt it on their own terms. 
2. Data Representation Languages of Interest 
As previously discussed, Extensible Markup Language (XML) provides declarative basis 
for customized, strictly defined data definitions of interest. Autonomous Vehicle Command 
Language (AVCL) is defined using XML schema for strict validation of syntax, particularly 
hierarchical data modeling relationships, strictly defined enumerations and legal values for 
numerical values. 
Semantic Web languages add the ability to perform queries and reasoning. Turtle (Terse 
Triple Language) deconstructs AVCL into primitives. Similarly, RDF/OWL expresses logical 
conditions and constraints of Mission Execution Ontology (MEO) corresponding to AVCL. 
SPARQL query language enables further inspection and verification of logical relationships. 
The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) syntax is also available, but was not used in this 
project. JSON has common use and has potential to match XML expressiveness, but currently 
has lesser validation maturity.  Deployment of original orders via JSON translations is an option. 
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3. Programming Languages of Interest 
Java is primary language used for exemplar robot controllers. It is used in AUV 
Workbench and various build processes. C++ and C# (C sharp) have similar expressiveness but 
are not currently used in this project. Lisp and Prolog are used for testing AVCL mission-tasking 
logic. Both are well suited for AI applications. Earlier thesis work similarly applied CLIPS 
expert-system rule bases. Of note: AVCL missions can be used to auto-generate exemplar source 
code in various alternative languages by creating XLST conversion stylesheets, thus showing an 
interoperability path to all manner of robotic systems. 
4. Presentation Languages of Interest 
HTML5 can be used for mission reports as portable, archival Web pages. Also, HTML5 
has Cascading Style Sheets (CSS) for consistency and quality. KML is an XML language for 
annotated, animated place marks on maps and globes. KML examples are: 
OpenStreetMap/OpenSeaMap, Google maps, etc. Extensible 3D (X3D) Graphics is an XML 
language for 3D visualization and animation. Future publication of missions is expected in the 
SPIDERS3D virtual environments (VE). 
5. Simulation: AUV Workbench 
The AUV Workbench supports underwater, surface and air vehicles modeling and 
simulation. NPS researchers have used AUV Workbench for rehearsal of physics-based mission 
response, real-time task-level control of robot missions, and replay of recorded results. AUV 
Workbench software is under the industry-friendly open-source license, Sourceforge. AUV 
Workbench is also based on the RBM 3-level architecture and AVCL commands. Additionally, 
AUV Workbench is used to rehearse strategic-level agenda missions (see 
https://savage.nps.edu/AuvWorkbench).  





Figure 19. Visualization of the Four Exemplar Missions for Unmanned Systems Using AUV Workbench 
 
Refer to the project website (link provided in Appendix A) for additional information on 
the implementation of AUV Workbench and associated lessons learned. 
 
D. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE/MACHINE LEARNING (AI/ML) 
AI algorithms for Machine Learning (ML) and Data Mining are often based on 
statistically training against large datasets to find patterns for filters, e.g., convolutional neural 
networks, genetic algorithms, reinforcement learning, etc. The techniques often require 
identifying right/wrong matches within large search spaces. Such predictive analytics are useful 
for classification models using detailed and noisy sensor data. Given the central importance of 
Identification, Friend, Foe, Neutral, or Unknown (IFFNU) and some conditional communications 
to ethical control, ML filters can be helpful—if carefully applied. Nevertheless, such approaches 
are not appropriate for carefully following Rules of Engagement (ROE), Laws of Armed Conflict 
(LOAC) or other ethical prerequisites, especially when human expertise and judgement is 
essential for robot teams. Similarly, massive computation or Quantum Computing approaches 
might be useful in some problems, but are not of practical use for Ethical Control mission orders 
given by human commanders judiciously guiding remote mobile robots. 
In context, Naval history has long shown that sound human judgement is crucial for 
assessing best strategies and courses of action in ill-structured contexts. Therefore, based on the 
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aforementioned assessments of AI/ML and Semantic Web approaches, this research concludes 
that Semantic Web approaches are more preferable and actionable for Ethical Control of 



























This project has made much progress toward achieving a methodology for implementing 
ethical control of unmanned systems in an integrated, validatable framework. Many 
opportunities are becoming possible as follow-on to our research. Therefore, a comprehensive 
pursuit of multiple integrated capabilities is essential to implementation of ethical control. 
 
A. SUMMARY OF CRADA PROJECT ACCOMPLISHMENTS 
 This project accomplished all tasks set forth in the NPS-Raytheon CRADA Project 1 
Statement of Work: 
1. NPS Tasks 
 Review existing and emerging policy guidance of the US Department of Defense and 
related international organizations.  
 Design and apply remote ethical human supervision capabilities to one or more scenarios 
and systems of mutual interest. Approach: 
 Define mission tasking and mission constraints for a short set of specific 
operations. 
 Model entities similarly for unclassified/open and more-sensitive missions of 
interest, as appropriate. 
 Show syntactic validation of mission correctness using existing tools. 
 Show semantic confirmation of task completeness and non-contradictory 
constraints. 
 Provide constructive approaches suggesting how to apply results in related 
problems. 
 Show working simulations that illustrate how Semantic Web technologies can be 
applied for robot-agnostic trusted tasking by human warfighters. 
 Consider environmental, geopolitical, security and human life implications for associated 
anti-tamper/cyber solutions and provide recommended courses of action for further 
development. 
2. Raytheon Tasks 
 Provide information on specific undersea weapon system capabilities and developments 
of interest, in order to bound design considerations. 
 Provide information on acoustic command, control, and communications (C3) methods 
relevant to problem of interest. 
 Provide information on system integrity technologies relevant to problem of interest. 
 Provide scenarios and identify systems of shared interest suitable for designing and 
applying remote ethical human supervision. 
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3. Joint Raytheon-NPS Tasks 
 Develop estimates of emerging of undersea weapon system capability maturity based on 
policy (impact and limitations). 
 Plan and participate in Technical Interchange Meetings.  
 Consider/identify technology and functional capability shortfalls in relevant systems. 
 Participate in monthly progress meetings via appropriate remote methods. 
 Review, analyze and iteratively improve the scenario-based results. 
 Disseminate results. 
 
B. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS 
Ultimately, Ethical Control Leads to Better Warfighting. Through this research and 
development of the MEO methodology, the main conclusion is that Human supervision is 
required for any unmanned system holding potential for lethal force. Humans, especially 
Warfighters, cannot presumptuously push the “big red shiny AI button” and hope for best—that 
is immoral and unlawful. Similar imperatives for command and control exist for supervising 
systems holding lifesaving potential. Moreover, human control of unmanned systems is possible 
at long ranges of time-duration and distance through well-defined mission orders. It cannot be 
overemphasized that both Human Operators and Commanders in Human-Machine Teams remain 
essential for lifesaving and potentially lethal scenarios. 
Structured mission orders are the crucial bridge for ethical control. The mission orders 
must be Readable and sharable by both humans and unmanned systems. The mission orders 
should have Validatable syntax and semantics through understandable logical constraints. The 
orders also should be Testable and confirmable using simulation, visualization, and perhaps 
qualification. Such a Coherent human-system team approach is feasible and repeatable. By 
applying the MEO methodology to mission orders and applying Semantic Web Standards for 
confirmation, commanders and mission planners can ensure that mission orders for unmanned 
maritime systems are comprehensive and consistent.  
 
C. DETAILED DISCUSSION 
This section discusses in detail the conclusions from this research. 
1. Mission Command of Unmanned Systems 
The paradigm of command relationship the Joint Force implements is Mission Command. 
According to Joint Publication 3-32, Joint Maritime Operations, Mission Command summarily 
has the following characteristics: 
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• “Mission Command is the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution 
based upon mission-type orders. Commanders issue mission-type orders focused on the 
purpose of the operation rather than on the details of how to perform assigned tasks.” 
• “Mission-type orders enable continued operations allowing subordinates to exercise 
initiative consistent with the higher commander’s intent and act independently to 
accomplish the mission in conditions where communications are restricted, 
compromised, or denied.”  
• “Naval command relationships are based on a philosophy of mission command involving 
centralized guidance, collaborative planning, and decentralized control and execution. 
With a long-standing practice of using mission-type orders, Naval C2 practices are 
intended to achieve relative advantage through organizational ability to rapidly observe, 
orient, decide, and act.”  
• “The joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC) must have the capability to 
exercise command and control (C2) of maritime forces and to accomplish a broad range 
of missions in denied or degraded environments. Subordinate commanders execute 
operations independently with a thorough understanding of the commander’s intent. Joint 
maritime operations tend to be decentralized, and unity of effort is made possible via 
mission command.” 
This research and development of Mission Execution Ontology (MEO) methodology led 
to the conclusion that the Human-Machine Team can have a Mission Command relationship: 
The Human Commander issues mission-type orders to the assigned unmanned systems, and the 
unmanned systems in turn perform the assigned mission autonomously in accordance with the 
mission orders. A Chain of Trust enables this relationship as the mission orders are conceived, 
disseminated, and executed.  
2. Trusted Command Authority and Trusted Autonomy 
The Human-Machine Team in Naval operations must have a command relationship that 
is robust and resilient in the maritime domain as characterized above—through long distance, 
latency in communication due to physical limitations of the environment, and with the adversary 
applying disruptive and deceptive means that deny or degrade the means to maintain command 
and control. At the ends of the chain of trust in this Mission Command relationship are the 
Trusted Command Authority and the Trusted Autonomy. The Command Authority in the 
Human-Machine Team is deemed trustworthy when it clearly articulates its Commander’s Intent 
in its mission orders to the unmanned systems. This project has demonstrated that the MEO 
methodology is able to validate and confirm the mission order before it is issued. The receiving 
Autonomous system is considered trustworthy when it is deemed competent to execute the 
mission-type orders it receives. As a result, testing of the ability of unmanned systems to execute 
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exemplar missions can be accomplished using simulation. A recommendation for future work is 
to advance the research through field experimentations and additional exemplar missions.  
3. Data-Centric Security 
The Chain of Trust connecting the Trusted Command Authority and the Trusted 
Autonomy in the Human-Machine Team may be accomplished by Data-Centric Security for the 
mission orders—using XML-based structure for compression, digital signature, and encryption 
of data models and information exchange. We recommend the following next steps in developing 
Data-Centric Security: implement it for Human-Machine Teams; evaluate its efficacy; and 
deploy tests to determine its effectiveness. Data-Centric Security can provide guarantees of 
command authority over the application of lethal or lifesaving force by unmanned systems. Open 
standards and implementations in XML exist for each component: compression, signature, 
encryption, assertion metadata, etc. Alternative technologies are also available. Composition 
testing with robots during field experimentation (FX) can extend laboratory results with real-
world experience, risk analysis and red-team testing. Further work is recommended. 
4. Compliance of Ethical Control of Unmanned Systems with Governing 
Policies, Guidelines, and Doctrine 
Researchers for this project reviewed existing and emerging policy guidance of the US 
Department of Defense (DoD) and related international organizations. The Reference Section of 
this report contains descriptions of the policies, directives, and guidance considered for this 
project. Noteworthy is the fact that the MEO methodology is consistent with DoD AI Strategy 
and adoption of the Defense Innovation Board (DIB) Recommendations for AI Ethics Principles: 
Responsible, Equitable, Traceable, Reliable, and Governable. The MEO methodology first 
represents mission orders in AVCL, a structured vocabulary for unmanned-system missions and 
a command and control language for humans supervising autonomous unmanned vehicles. Its 
Clarity arises from close correspondence to human Naval terminology. AVCL-structured 
vocabulary defines terms and relationships for mission planning, execution, conduct, recording 
and replay across diverse robot types. Decision-flow diagrams expressed as mission orders are 
issued to task the unmanned system, and the formal mission orders are validated using Semantic 
Web Standards. Conduct of each mission order is then confirmed by performing simulation of 
the mission. 
 59 
5. System Architecture and Design: Modular Open System Architecture 
Researchers for this project deliberately chose to use XML-based AVCL and Semantic 
Web Standards for their open standards characteristics. Additionally, missions represented in 
AVCL can be used to autogenerate exemplar source code in various alternative languages by 
creating conversion stylesheets. These open and modular characteristics of the MEO 
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VIII. RECOMMENDED FUTURE WORK 
The following topics are recommended for future research. The topics are prioritized 
based on urgency and impact relative to implementing the MEO methodology for Ethical 
Control of Unmanned Systems. 
 
A. ENGAGE NAVY STAKEHOLDERS FOR ETHICAL CONTROL OF 
UNMANNED SYSTEMS 
1. Incorporate Ethical Control in Unmanned Maritime Autonomy Architecture 
(UMAA) and Common Control System (CCS) 
The Navy is standardizing autonomy interfaces for unmanned systems as a part of the 
Unmanned Maritime Autonomy Architecture (UMAA) and to standardize unmanned systems 
vehicle planning and control as a part of the Common Control System (CCS) acquisition and 
design efforts. (Small, 2019) This project on Ethical Control of Unmanned Systems using the 
MEO methodology would contribute to Navy’s effort of standardizing unmanned and 
autonomous technologies. Recommendation: Brief PMS 406 on the findings of the project, and 
participate in activities in its Core Technology Enabler for Autonomy. 
2. Determine Implications in Integrated Naval Force Structure 
The pending 2020 Integrated Naval Force Structure Assessment (INFSA) considers a 
combination of manned and unmanned vessels for Naval missions. (O’Rourke, 2020) The 
operationalization of large unmanned surface and undersea vehicles conducting Naval missions 
needs to implement ethical command and control of these unmanned systems.  
Recommendations:  
• Engage staffs of Navy Warfare Directorates, Type Commanders, and unmanned vehicle 
squadrons, in addition to PMS 406. Recommended topics of the engagements are: 
operations, plans, policy, and requirements, and resourcing of unmanned systems with 
due regard to the feasibility of applying ethical control in enabling the unmanned systems 
to conduct qualified missions. 
• Establish an NPS Center for Ethical Warfighting to explore both educational and applied 
capabilities, in order to put theory into practice. 
• Establish collaboration within the Naval Education Enterprise (e.g., NPS, Naval War 
College, Marine Corps University, and Naval Academy) and other institutions (e.g., U.S. 
Military Academy) on ethical use of unmanned systems. 
 
 62 
3. Establish Qualifications Process of Unmanned Systems for Naval Operations 
This project has demonstrated the feasibility of establishing a qualification process for 
ethical control of unmanned systems. By applying the MEO methodology, Semantic Web and 
Data-Centric Security technologies, the Navy can establish a Verification, Validation, and 
Accreditation (VV&A) program to qualify unmanned systems for Naval missions, in order to 
ensure Ethical and Secure C2 in denied/deceptive environments. The VV&A program needs to 
include certification of unmanned systems compliance to mission orders and constraints—this 
can be done using Semantic Web standards for unmanned systems Mission Execution 
Ontologies, testing in comprehensive virtual environments, with hardware/software in the loop, 
in scenarios stressing requirements and capabilities of the unmanned system for the mission. 
Integrating Data-Centric Security ensures Trusted Autonomy and Command Authority for the 
Human-Machine Team. 
Recommendation: Develop a rigorous qualification process of unmanned systems 
with lethal effects for operations in denied/degraded/deceptive environments. Similar to 
how Human Warfighters confirm understanding and trust through qualification processes, the 
following elements pertain to qualifying unmanned systems for assigned missions: 
• Design, construct “qualification card” for testing unmanned systems. 
• Comprehensive virtual environment, hardware/software in the loop. 
• Carefully crafted scenario testing of key requirements and capabilities. 
• Anti-pattern tests to provoke and confirm constraints are not violated. 
• Record all unit-test decision trees, decision-branching traces, and results as a certification 
record for each hardware/software version of robots. 
• Visualize realistic rehearsal, real-time and replay of robot operations repeatably using 
shared Web-based SPIDERS3D virtual environment. 
• Humans assess mission logs and scenario outcomes for after-action analysis, lessons 
learned, and continuous improvement via suite of unit tests. 
B. CONTINUE CANONICAL MISSION DEVELOPMENT AND ONTOLOGY 
REFINEMENTS 
This project has shown that the MEO methodology is an effective methodology for 
expressing mission orders in a way that is validatable with respect to ethical control of the 
unmanned systems that would perform the mission. Nevertheless, the ontology can be refined so 
as to formalize the Vehicle, Vehicle Feature, Constraint, etc., and like concepts and relationships 
in the ontology. This refinement is recommended as a future research effort.  
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Recommendations for continuing MEO development and refinement:  
• Prepare and develop comprehensive testing of unmanned systems mission orders across 
the range of assigned mission requirements that constitute the operational qualification 
process for the unmanned system. 
• Formalize Vehicle, Vehicle Feature, Constraint, etc., and like concepts and relationships 
in the ontology. 
• Demonstrate best practices for characterizing common mission phases in order to 
establish testable design patterns for mission orders as templates that aid operators in 
issuing clear and validatable mission orders. 
• Express precisely in AVCL all termination conditions as constraints in MEO for 
algorithm loop management. 
 
C. IMPLEMENT PLANNED IMPROVEMENTS IN AVCL AND AUV 
WORKBENCH 
Even as this project uses AVCL to represent mission orders for unmanned systems, AUV 
Workbench is also used for simulating unmanned system missions. The AUV Workbench 
supports underwater, surface and air vehicles. It has the capability to enable rehearsal of physics-
based mission response. AUV Workbench allows for real-time task-level control of robot 
missions, and replay of recorded results. It has industry-friendly open-source license, 
Sourceforge, and has been used to rehearse strategic-level agenda missions. The basis of AUV 
Workbench is the RBM 3-level architecture and AVCL commands.  
Recommendation: Improve AVCL and AUV Workbench as follows:  
• Upgrade legacy codebase and libraries to latest versions of Java. 
• Upgrade AUV Workbench to support AVCL version 3 missions. 
• Near term remains quite simple, backwards compatibility via AVCL3  AVCL2 
conversion. 
• Display conduct of canonical missions developed in this project. 
• Manually record videos of mission demonstrations and playbacks. 
• Update mission production of HTML reports, KML maps, X3D graphics. 
• Support project report and multiple peer-review presentations. 
• Define unit tests and expected results for verification and validation. 
• Extract a simple standalone AVCL parser for general Java use. 
• Develop a test routine showing how to build all possible choice sequences and 
automating exhaustive testing of all choices in all missions as an initial exemplar for 
exhaustive verification of mission logic. 
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• Establish design patterns for qualification testing of software and hardware running “in 
the loop” to confirm that individual robots operate safely, and so qualify their abilities to 
follow AVCL missions. 
 
D. INCORPORATE DATA-CENTRIC SECURITY FOR SYSTEM INTEGRITY 
AND SECURITY OF UNMANNED SYSTEMS C3 
This project has considered environmental, geopolitical, security and human life 
implications for associated anti-tamper/cyber solutions, and recommends courses of action for 
further development. Data-Centric Security is one instantiation of system security practices.  
Recommendations for continuing research and consideration as follow: 
• Develop a Distributed Ledger of all messages sent and received to reduce the risk of 
spoofing or counterfeit messages compromising unmanned systems (IV.A). 
• Apply Blockchain technology to Ethical Control of unmanned systems, providing 
assurances that scale among diverse participants and over time, without needing a central 
hub (IV.A). 
• Continue advancement of Data-Centric Security through field experimentations and 
additional exemplar missions (V.A.1). 
• Implement Data-Centric Security for Human-Machine Teams; evaluate its efficacy; and 
deploy tests to determine its effectiveness. 
• Implement physical security/integrity of edge processors onboard the unmanned systems 
(Unmanned System Hardware). 
• Apply efficient messaging and keying algorithms, including asymmetric techniques 
(Unmanned System Software). 
• Implement SecDevOps process to analyze threats and identify/resolve 
weakness/vulnerability (System Architecture). 
These continuing research topics will inform and influence cyber strategy and 
cybersecurity policy for unmanned systems and Human-Machine Teaming. 
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APPENDIX A.  ONLINE DOCUMENTATION 
The NPS Ethical Control of Unmanned Systems website contains the documentation for this 
research and report. Link to the website is: https://savage.nps.edu/EthicalControl  
 
Documentation: 
• Ethical Control of Unmanned Systems overview presentations that describe all aspects of 
this project, along with related work and relevant resources. The presentations are in pdf 
files and mp4 video recordings. 
• Ethical Control flyer and project quad chart (.pdf). 
• Network Optional Warfare (NOW) for deliberate, stealthy, minimalist tactical 
communications. 
• Network Optional Warfare (NOW): Ethical Control of Unmanned Systems overview. 
• Presentations, papers, figures, flyers and reports are all available in the documentation 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
6-DOF 6 Degrees of Freedom 
A/IS Autonomous and Intelligent Systems 
AI Artificial Intelligence 
AI/ML Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning 
AVCL Autonomous Vehicle Command Language 
AUV Autonomous Unmanned Vehicle 
AUVW AUV Workbench 
C2 Command and Control 
C3 Command, Control, and Communications 
C2D2E Command and Control in a Denied or Degraded Environment 
CCS Common Control System 
CRADA Cooperative Research and Development Agreement 
CRUSER Consortium for Robotics and Unmanned Systems Research and Education 
CSS Cascading Style Sheet 
DB Database 
DIB Defense Innovation Board 
DoD Department of Defense 
DL Description Logic 
DS Digital Signature 
EM Electromagnetic 
EXI Efficient XML Interchange 
FX Field Experimentation 
GIGO Garbage In. Garbage Out. 
HTML Hypertext Markup Language 
IA Information Assurance 
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
IFFNU Identification Friend, Foe, Neutral, or Unknown 
INFSA Integrated Naval Force Structure Assessment 
JAIC Joint Artificial Intelligence Center 
JFMCC Joint Force Maritime Component Commander 
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JSON JavaScript Object Notation 
KR Knowledge Representation 
LCIM Levels of Conceptual Interoperability Model 
LOAC Laws of Armed Conflict 
MEE Mission Execution Engine 
MEO Mission Execution Ontology 
NAML Naval Applications of Machine Learning 
NPS Naval Postgraduate School 
NOW Network Optional Warfare 
OODA Observe-Orient-Decide-Act 
OWL Web Ontology Language 
RDF Resource Description Format 
RDF/S Resource Description Format/Schema 
ROE Rules of Engagement 
ROS Robot Operating System 
ROS-M Robot Operating System-Military 
RST Rich Semantic Track 
SISO Simulation Interoperability Standards Organization 
SPARQL SPARQL Protocol and RDF Query Language 
TLS Transport Layer Security 
TRL Technology Readiness Level 
TTP Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 
Turtle Terse Triple Language 
UAS Unmanned Air System 
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (synonymous with Unmanned Air Vehicle) 
UMAA Unmanned Maritime Autonomous Architecture 
UML Unified Markup Language 
USV Unmanned Surface Vessel (or Vehicle) 
UUV Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (or Vessel) 
VE Virtual Environments 
VV&A Verification, Validation, and Accreditation 
W3C World Wide Web Consortium 
X3D Extensible 3D Graphics International Standard 
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XML Extensible Markup Language 
XML-Enc XML Encryption 
XSLT Extensible Stylesheet Language for Transformation 




























A. RELATED ETHICAL RESEARCH ACTIVITIES 
Ethics of lethality and unmanned systems is an active area of work. The following 
forums, with synopses distilled from each, are particularly important in this emerging area of 
research . 
1. The Campaign To Stop Killer Robots. (2020). Retrieved from 
https://www.stopkillerrobots.org   
Fully autonomous weapons are a fundamental change to the nature of war. 
Problem aspects include: lethal force without human intervention, destabilizing robotics arms 
race, lower threshold to decide on war, lack of human judgement for proportionality, lack of 
accountability or culpability, further use against populations by oppressive regimes. 
Their proposed solution: development, production and use of fully autonomous weapons must be 
banned. Retain meaningful human control through laws and treaty, international commitment to 
ban by countries, pledge by technology companies/organizations/individuals to never contribute 
to development of fully autonomous weapons. 
Includes notable endorsements. 
2. The IEEE Global Initiative on Ethics of Autonomous and Intelligent Systems (A/IS). (2020). 
Retrieved from https://ethicsinaction.ieee.org 
Resources include Ethically Aligned Design, First Edition, the culmination of a three-year, 
globally open and iterative process involving thousands of global experts. 
“The most comprehensive, crowd-sourced global treatise regarding the Ethics of Autonomous 
and Intelligent Systems available today.” 
It is time to move “From Principles to Practice” in society regarding the governance of emerging 
autonomous and intelligent systems. The implementation of ethical principles must be validated 
by dependable applications of A/IS in practice.  
3. IEEE Standards Association Project P7007—Ontological Standard for Ethically Driven 
Robotics and Automation Systems. (2020). Retrieved from 
https://standards.ieee.org/project/7007.html 
The standard establishes a set of ontologies with different abstraction levels that contain 
concepts, definitions and axioms which are necessary to establish ethically driven methodologies 
for the design of Robots and Automation Systems. 
Working Group EDRA - Ontologies for Ethically Driven Robotics and Automation. (IEEE 
membership and patent-policy compliance required for participation.) 
Active Work: Align several Ethical Control terms, concepts, use cases.  
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4. Unmanned Maritime Autonomy Architecture (UMAA). UMAA is the proposed critical path 
forward for continuing efforts in Ethical Control of unmanned maritime systems. Several 
Navy publications, presentations, and announcements regarding UMAA are relevant: 
Burges, R. R. (2019, February 20). “Navy Requests Information for Unmanned Maritime 
Autonomy Architecture.” Retrieved from https://seapowermagazine.org/navy-requests-
information-for-unmanned-maritime-autonomy-architecture 
Small, P. (2019, January 15). Unmanned Maritime Systems Update. Retrieved from 
https://www.navsea.navy.mil/Portals/103/Documents/Exhibits/SNA2019/UnmannedMaritimeSy
s-Small.pdf 
Automated Management of Maritime Navigation Safety, Navy SBIR 2020.1—Topic N201-059. 
Retrieved from: https://www.navysbir.com/n20_1/N201-059.htm 
 
B. RELATED RESOURCES OF INTEREST 
This project draws on multiple relevant activities and capabilities. The following 
resources, with synopses distilled from each, were particularly important to the writing of this 
report and are highly recommended for further reading. 
Autonomous Vehicle Command Language (AVCL). AVCL is a command and control language 
for autonomous unmanned vehicles, enabling common XML-based representations for mission 
scripts, agenda plans and post-mission recorded telemetry. Operators can utilize a single 
archivable and validatable format for robot tasking and results that is directly convertible to and 
from a wide variety of different robot command languages. Retrieved from 
https://savage.nps.edu/Savage/AuvWorkbench/AVCL/AVCL.html  
Don Brutzman, Curtis L. Blais, Duane T. Davis, and Robert B. McGhee, “Ethical Mission 
Definition and Execution for Maritime Robots Under Human Supervision," IEEE Journal Of 
Oceanic Engineering, vol. 43, no. 2, April 2018, pp. 427-443. 
Davis, Duane T., Brutzman, Donald P., Blais, Curtis L. and McGhee, Robert B., “Ethical 
Mission Definition and Execution for Maritime Robotic Vehicles: A Practical Approach,” 
MTS/IEEE OCEANS 2016 Conference, Monterey California, 19-23 September 2016. 
Duane T. Davis, Semantic Web and Inferencing Technologies for Mission Definition, Technical 
Report, Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Monterey California, 2014. 
Chief of Naval Operations. Navy Concept for Distributed Maritime Operations. January 2019. 
(Classified Document) 
Conceptual Chunking. Based on the concept in cognitive psychology. Chunking (psychology). In 
Wikipedia. Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chunking_(psychology)  
Data-Centric Security 
• Digital Signature.  Apache SantuarioTM enables digital signature for implementing 
security for XML. In Apache Santuario. Retrieved from https://santuario.apache.org 
• Distributed Ledger. An enabling technology that contributes to Data-Centric Security. In 
Wikipedia. Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distributed_ledger  
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• Williams, Jeffrey S. Document-based Message-centric Security using XML 
Authentication and Encryption for Coalition and Interagency Operations (Master’s 
thesis). Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2009. 
• Miller, Shaurice S., Compile To Combat In Twenty-Four Hours (C2c24): The New 
Normal (Master’s thesis). Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2019. 
• XML. In Wikipedia. Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XML 
• Zero Trust. Rose, Borchert, Mitchell, and Connelly. (2020). Retrieved from 
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-207/draft 
DoD Directive 3000.09, “Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” November 21, 2012, with change 1, 
May 8, 2017. This directive is the controlling reference overall for the research project. 
• Establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities for the development and use of 
autonomous and semi-autonomous functions in weapon systems, including manned and 
unmanned platforms. 
• Establishes guidelines designed to minimize the probability and consequences of failures 
in autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems that could lead to unintended 
engagements. 
• Autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems shall be designed to allow 
commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use 
of force. 
• Persons who authorize the use of, direct the use of, or operate autonomous and semi-
autonomous weapon systems must do so with appropriate care and in accordance with the 
law of war, applicable treaties, weapon system safety rules, and applicable rules of 
engagement (ROE). 
Hughes, W., & Girrier, R. (2018). Fleet Tactics and Naval Operations (3rd ed.). Annapolis, MD: 
Naval Institute Press.  
• “At the most fundamental level, [Information Warfare] IW is about how to employ and 
protect the ability to sense, assimilate, decide, communicate, and act—while confounding 
those same processes that support the adversary.”  
• “Information Warfare broadly conceived is orthogonal to naval tactics. As a 
consequence, IW is having major effects on all six processes of naval tactics used in fleet 
combat—scouting and antiscouting, command-and-control, C2 countermeasures, delivery 
of fire, and confounding enemy fire.” 
• “Indeed there is a mounting wave of concern about how far automation will expand and 
what its impact will be on the continuum of cognition from data to information to 
knowledge. […] Navies are facing similar uncertainties.” 
Note: The late Wayne Hughes coined the term “Network Optional Warfare” after many 
discussion sessions, directly contrasting it to Network Centric Warfare. The authors of this 
research are grateful for his tremendous contribution to Naval Warfare. 
John Boyd and OODA Loop. 
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• John Boyd (military strategist). (2020, May 16). In Wikipedia. Retrieved from  
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Boyd_(military_strategist)  
• OODA loop. (2020, May 11). In Wikipedia. Retrieved from 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OODA_loop  
• Coram, R. (2004). Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War. New York, NY: 
Back Bay Books. 
Network Optional Warfare (NOW) 
• Brutzman, D. P., & Wyatt, T. D. (2020, January 2). In Network Optional Warfare. 
Retrieved from https://wiki.nps.edu/display/NOW/Network%20Optional%20Warfare 
• Naval forces do not have to be engaged in constant centralized communication. 
Deployed Navy vessels have demonstrated independence of action in stealthy 
coordinated operations for hundreds of years. 
• Littoral operations, deployable unmanned systems, and a refactored force mix for surface 
ships pose a growing set of naval challenges and opportunities. Network-optional warfare 
(NOW) precepts include Efficient Messaging, Optical Signaling, Semantic Coherence, 
and Ethical Human Supervision of Autonomy for deliberate, stealthy, minimalist tactical 
communications. 
Rich Semantic Track (RST.) RST is related work on sharing and collective understanding for 
track data. 
• DoD mandates data-sharing practices, but practices have been mixed and uneven, 
resulting in perpetuation of system-centric data practices. 
• Sharing and collective understanding of track data—collections of time-stamped 
perceptions of the state of objects of interest—are critical to warfighting systems. 
• Shared understanding requires common semantics. 
• RST ontology provides a foundation for shared understanding of track data. 
• Blais, C. L. (2015, May 20). Rich Semantic Track: Formalizing the semantics and 
pragmatics of track data for interchange and common processing, Presentation to the 
2015 MOVES Academic Working Group (MAWG), Naval Postgraduate School. 
• Tolk, Andreas, Saikou Y. Diallo, Charles D. Turnitsa, and Leslie S. Winters. 2006 
"Composable M&S Web Services for Net-centric Applications." Journal for Defense 
Modeling & Simulation 3, no. 1 (January): 27-44. 
• Blais, Curtis, and Lee W. Lacy. 2004. “Semantic Web: Implications for Modeling and 
Simulation System Interoperability.” Paper presented at the Fall 2004 Simulation 
Interoperability Workshop, Orlando, FL. 
Note: It is time to change the way DoD manages data and engineers systems, starting with 
adoption of the RST ontology and moving toward the vision of a Web of linked track data. 
Military Ethics and Justice. Publications and organizations that constitute, inform, educate, and 
advocate for military ethics and justice. 
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• National Institute of Military Justice. NIMJ has a repository for Operational Law, 
including International Humanitarian Law/Law of Armed Conflict/Law of War. 
Retrieved from https://nimj.org/topics/operational-law/ihlloaclow 
• Lucas, G. (2016). Military Ethics: What Everyone Needs to Know. New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press. 
• Lucas, G. (2016). Ethics and Cyber Warfare: The Quest for Responsible Security in the 
Age of Digital Warfare. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
• Strawser, B. J. (Ed.). (2012). Killing by Remote Control: The Ethics of an Unmanned 
Military. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
• Strawser, B. J. (Ed.). (2017). Who Should Die? The Ethics of Killing in War. New York, 
NY: Oxford University Press. 
• Demy, T. J., Lucas, G. R., & Strawser, B. J. (Eds.). (2014). Military Ethics and Emerging 
Technology. New York, NY: Routledge. 
• The International Society for Military Ethics. (2020). Retrieved from 
https://www.internationalsocietyformilitaryethics.org 
• Stockdale Center for Ethical Leadership, U.S. Naval Academy. Retrieved from 
https://www.usna.edu/Ethics 
• Schuller, A. L. (2017). “At the Crossroads of Control: AI in Autonomous Weapons and 
International Humanitarian Law,” Harvard National Security Journal, vol. 8 no. 2, May 
30, 2017, pp. 379-425. 
• Schuller, A. L. (2014). “Inimical Inceptions of Imminence: A New Approach to 
Anticipatory Self-Defense Under the Law of Armed Conflict,” UCLA Journal of 
International Law and Foreign Affairs, vol. 18, no. 2, 2014, pp. 161-206. 
• College of Leadership and Ethics, U.S. Naval War College. Retrieved from 
https://usnwc.edu/college-of-leadership-and-ethics 
• Naval Leadership and Ethics Center, U.S. Naval War College. Retrieved from 
https://www.public.navy.mil/netc/centers/nlec  
• Lewis, L. (March 2018). Redefining Human Control: Lessons from the Battlefield of 
Autonomous Weapons. Center for Autonomy and AI, Center for Naval Analyses. 
• Scharre, P. (2018). Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War. New 
York, NY: W.W. Norton. 
• Scharre, P., & Sayler, K. (April 2016). Autonomous Weapons and Human Control, 
Center for a New American Security. 
• Kessel, J. M. (2019, December 13). Killer Robots Aren’t Regulated. Yet. New York 
Times. “Killing in the Age of Algorithms” is a New York Times documentary examining 
the future of AI and warfare. 
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• Giacomo, C. (2019, June 26). Are You Ready for Weapons That Call Their Own Shots? 
New York Times. The speed with which the military is developing artificial intelligence 
raises fears of an autonomous weapons race. 
• Kelsey D. Atherton, K. D. (2018, November 15). Are Killer Robots the Future of War? 
Parsing the Facts on Autonomous Weapons. New York Times. Under what 
circumstances should militaries delegate the decision to take a human life? It is a moral 
leap that the international community is grappling with. 
• Markoff, J. (2014, November 11). Fearing Bombs That Can Pick Whom to Kill, New 
York Times. Weapons that rely on artificial intelligence to decide what to target could 
become increasingly difficult to control, critics warn. 
• United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Retrieved from 
https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf 
• UN Convention on Prohibition of Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (aka “Ottawa Treaty”). Retrieved from 
http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/mine_ban/text 
• International Court of Justice. Retrieved from https://www.icj-cij.org/en 
• Brutzman, D. P. (January 2016). Trusting Software and Trusting Data. Retrieved from 
https://wiki.nps.edu/display/NOW/2016/01/20/Trusting+Software+and+Trusting+Data 
• DoD Digital Modernization Strategy. Retrieved from 
https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/12/2002156622/-1/-1/1/DOD-DIGITAL-
MODERNIZATION-STRATEGY-2019.PDF 
• Brutzman, D. P. (February 2018). Autonomy Recommendation for ACM Code of Ethics 
and Professional Conduct. Retrieved from 
https://wiki.nps.edu/display/NOW/2018/02/10/Autonomy+Recommendation+for+ACM+
Code+of+Ethics+and+Professional+Conduct 
• Blais, C. L., & McGregor, D. (September 2016). Modeling Manned and Unmanned 
Systems, Curtis L. NPS Technical Report NPS-MV-16-002. Retrieved from 
https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/50678  
• Holwitt, J. I. (2013). “Execute against Japan”: The U.S. Decision to Conduct 
Unrestricted Submarine Warfare (Vol. 121). College Station, TX: Texas A&M 
University Press. 
Recommend Reading on Semantic Web and X3D, as well as simulation standards. 
• Semantic Web Stack. In Wikipedia. Retrieved from 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semantic_Web_Stack  
• Allemang, D., & Hendler, J. (2011). Semantic Web for the Working Ontologist: Effective 
Modeling in RDFS and OWL (2nd ed.). Burlington, MA: Morgan Kaufmann.  
• Brutzman, D. P., & Daly, L. (2007). X3D: Extensible 3D Graphics for Web Authors (1st 
ed.). Burlington, MA: Morgan Kaufmann.  
• Duchame, R. (2013). Learning SPARQL (2nd ed.). Boston, MA: O'Reilly Media.  
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• Sikos, L. (2015). Mastering Structured Data on the Semantic Web: From HTML5 
Microdata to Linked Open Data. New York, NY: Apress.  
• Wikibooks SPARQL edition covers both language and also Web-based GUI: Wikidata 
Query Service SPARQL endpoint. Retrieved from 
https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/SPARQL 
• X3D Ontology for Semantic Web has details, source for semantic query of X3D models, 
and is of direct interest to this project. Retrieved from 
https://www.web3d.org/x3d/content/semantics/semantics.html  
• X3D Ontology presentation includes design considerations that are relevant for next 
stages of work in this project. Retrieved from 
https://www.web3d.org/x3d/content/semantics/documentation/presentations/X3dOntolog
yForSemanticWeb.pdf 
• Semantic Web Pro Workshop (2019, December 3). Paris, France. “Semantic Web 
techniques and standards have emerged in many fields. By facilitating interoperability 
across the Web, they are giving new impetus to the integration of heterogeneous data and 
the construction of knowledge graphs that provide a foundation for dynamic business 
ecosystems.” Retrieved from https://www.web3d.org/event/semantic-web-pro-
semwebpro  
• Brutzman, D. P., Carlson, J., Flotyński, J., Hamza-Lup, F., Malamos, A., Mouton, C., 
Petit, M., Polys, N., Sikos, L., & Walczak, K. (2019, December 3). “The Semantic 
Web3D: Towards comprehensive representation of 3D content on the semantic web.” 
Semantic Web Pro Workshop, Paris, France. Retrieved from 
https://www.web3d.org/sites/default/files/attachment/node/2436/edit/20191203-Web3D-
semanticweb-SWP2019.pdf 
• Collaborative 3D Visualization for Ashore, Afloat and Expeditionary Readiness 
Workshop. (2019, December 6). Virginia Tech and Web3D Consortium workshop, 
Arlington, VA. One-day workshop to provide presentations to Naval enterprise leaders 
on the use of collaborative Web-based #X3D visualization techniques by Government, 
Academia and Industry practitioners. Retrieved from 
https://www.web3d.org/event/collaborative-3d-visualization-ashore-afloat-and-
expeditionary-readiness-workshop 
• Brutzman, D. P. (2019, November 13-15). Navy/USCG Scenario-Based Planning using 
SPIDERS3D Collaborative Visualization: Notional Concept Study and Scenario 
Exploration. Maritime Risk Symposium, 2019, Bronx, NY. This presentation is related 
work to this project. It describes deployment planning for XLUUV at Port Hueneme, CA, 
in support of COMOPTEVFOR, NAVSEA PMS 406. Retrieved from 
https://savage.nps.edu/presentations/BrutzmanSpiders3dXluuvScenarioPortHuenemeUsc
gEvergreen.2019NOV13.pdf 
IEEE Distributed Interactive Simulation (DIS). DIS is of direct interest to this project. AUV 
Workbench outputs simulation results using DIS protocol, making it feasible to someday export 
and include Ethical Control testing in other Live Virtual Constructive (LVC) scenarios.  
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• IITSEC 2019 Tutorial Distributed Interactive Simulation (DIS) 101 (2019, December 2). 
Interservice Industry Training Simulation and Education Conference, 2019, Orlando, FL. 
“The Distributed Interactive Simulation (DIS) protocol is a well-established IEEE 
standard for packet-level exchange of state information between entities in military 
simulations. DIS facilitates simulation interoperability through a consistent over-the-wire 
format for information, widely agreed upon constant enumeration values, and 
community-consensus semantics.” Retrieved from https://www.web3d.org/event/iitsec-
2019-tutorial-distributed-interactive-simulation-dis-101 
• Github Open-DIS Software Archive (2020). Retrieved from https://github.com/open-dis 
• Brennenstuhl, T. (2019, December 2). Repeatable Unit Testing of Distributed Interactive 
Simulation (DIS) Protocol Behavior Streams using Web Standards. Interservice Industry 
Training Simulation and Education Conference, 2019, Orlando, FL. Retrieved from 
https://www.web3d.org/sites/default/files/attachment/node/2437/edit/BrennenstuhlThesis
OpenDisStreamsUnitTesting.2019DEC2.pdf 
Simulation Interoperability Standards Organization (SISO). SISO is an international organization 
dedicated to the promotion of modeling and simulation interoperability and reuse for the benefit 
of a broad range of Modeling and Simulation communities. Several SISO working groups are 
relevant to Ethical Control proposed plan to establish virtual environment for unmanned systems 
qualification. Retrieved from https://www.sisostds.org 
• C2SIM PDG/PSG. The Command and Control Systems - Simulation Systems 
Interoperation (C2SIM) Product Development Group (PDG) and Product Support Group 
(PSG) uses ontology-governed compatible message interchange, especially focused on 
NATO forces. Retrieved from 
https://www.sisostds.org/StandardsActivities/DevelopmentGroups/C2SIMPDGPSG-
CommandandControlSystems.aspx 
• DIS/RPR FOM. The Distributed Interactive Simulation / Real-time Platform Reference 
Federation Object Model (DIS / RPR FOM) PSG is a forum and library for DIS-related 
information for distributed simulation networks. Retrieved from 
https://www.sisostds.org/StandardsActivities/SupportGroups/DISRPRFOMPSG.aspx 
• VV&A PSG. The Verification, Validation and Accreditation/Acceptance (VV&A) PSG 
emphasizes requirements and metrics within larger Systems Engineering spirals. 
Retrieved from 
https://www.sisostds.org/StandardsActivities/SupportGroups/VVAProductsPSG.aspx 
Recommended Reading and Resources in Human-Machine Teaming and AI relevant to Ethical 
Control of unmanned systems. 
• Brutzman, D. P., & Fitzpatrick, C. R. (January 2020). Creating Virtual Environments for 
Evaluating Human-Machine Teaming. Naval Research Program (NRP) Project NPS-19-
M285-A. Retrieved from https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/64266 
• Johnson, M., & Vera, A. (Spring 2019). “No AI is an Island: The Case for Teaming 
Intelligence.” AI Magazine, vol. 40, no. 1. Proposes AI will reach its full potential only 
if, as part of its intelligence, it also has enough teaming intelligence to work well with 
people. The concepts Coactive Design and Interdependency Analysis have strong 
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resonances with Ethical Control that deserve further exploration. Retrieved from 
https://www.aaai.org/ojs/index.php/aimagazine/article/view/2842 
• Naval Research Advisory Committee (NRAC) (September 2017). Autonomous and 
Unmanned Systems in the Department of Navy. NRAC Technical Report. The Number 1 
Recommendation of the report is “create comprehensive data plan to field autonomy… 
DoN must urgently develop an organizational data plan… In the future, data will win 
wars… Data is the ultimate “component” for AI systems and must be controlled.” 
Retrieved from https://www.senedia.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/NRAC-Report-
Autonomous-and-Unmanned-Systems-in-the-Department-of-Navy.pdf 
• Naval Application of Machine Learning (NAML) Workshop. The 2018 Plenary 
roundtable discussion recognized value and need to establish a machine learning (ML) 
data strategy, for both inputs and outputs. The focus for 2020 “is on identifying future 
directions of ML and AI research needed to address mission priorities of both the Navy 
and the broader national security community.” Retrieved from 
https://sites.google.com/go.spawar.navy.mil/naml 
• Summary of the 2018 Department of Defense Artificial Intelligence Strategy: 
“Harnessing AI to Advance Our Security and Prosperity.” (2019 February). “Leading in 
military ethics and AI safety. The Department will articulate its vision and guiding 
principles for using AI in a lawful and ethical manner to promote our values. We will 
consult with leaders from across academia, private industry, and the international 
community to advance AI ethics and safety in the military context. We will invest in the 
research and development of AI systems that are resilient, robust, reliable, and secure; we 
will continue to fund research into techniques that produce more explainable AI; and we 
will pioneer approaches for AI test, evaluation, verification, and validation. We will also 
seek opportunities to use AI to reduce unintentional harm and collateral damage via 
increased situational awareness and enhanced decision support. As we improve the 
technology and our use of it, we will continue to share our aims, ethical guidelines, and 
safety procedures to encourage responsible AI development and use by other nations.” 
Retrieved from https://media.defense.gov/2019/Feb/12/2002088963/-1/-1/1/SUMMARY-
OF-DOD-AI-STRATEGY.PDF 
• Defense Innovation Board (DIB) AI Principles Project. (2019, October 31). AI 
Principles: Recommendations on the Ethical Use of Artificial Intelligence by the 
Department of Defense. The DIB members voted to approve the proposed AI Principles: 
Responsible, Equitable, Traceable, Reliable, Governable. Retrieved from 
https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/31/2002204458/-1/-
1/0/DIB_AI_PRINCIPLES_PRIMARY_DOCUMENT.PDF 
• Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC). Retrieved from https://www.ai.mil. The JAIC 
is tasked to execute DoD AI Strategy.  
• Department of Defense Prototyping Guidebook (2019 November). Version 2.0. Office of 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (Prototypes and 
Experiments).  
• CTF 151: Counter-Piracy. “In accordance with United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions, and in cooperation with CMF coastal states, CTF 151’s mission is to deter, 
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disrupt and suppress piracy and armed robbery at sea and to engage with regional and 
other partners to strengthen relevant capabilities in order to protect global maritime 
commerce and secure freedom of navigation.” Retrieved from 
https://combinedmaritimeforces.com/ctf-151-counter-piracy 
Feedback guidance from William “Doc” Bundy, Ph.D., CAPT, USN (Ret.), Naval War College, 
Newport Rhode Island on UUV Autonomy and this project (December 18, 2019).  
• UUVs will need to operate by mission command, like submarines, given broad missions 
and the UUV will decide what targets need to be engaged. 
• To follow this ethical argument, must build Mission Command capabilities into your 
intelligent agent controller. 
• High-confidence Automated Target recognition will be required. 
• We need to let machines kill things. 
• Relevant: Unrestricted submarine warfare in WWII. Recommended reading: “Execute 
Against Japan:” The US Decision to Conduct Unrestricted Submarine Warfare by 
Joel Holwitt (ibid.) 
• Noted “collaborative mission autonomy” as important concept / capability. 
• Recommendation: need to engage LTG Shanahan of Joint AI Command.  
Integrated Naval Force Structure Assessment (INFSA). The INFSA considers the implications of 
unmanned systems as parts of the overall Naval Force Structure. 
• Clark, B., & Walton, T. (2019, December 31). Taking Back the Seas: Transforming the 
U.S. Surface Fleet for Decision-Centric Warfare. Center for Strategic and Budgetary 
Assessments. “The U.S. Navy’s surface fleet is at a crossroads. Today’s force lacks the 
size, resilience, and offensive capacity to contribute effectively to degrading, delaying, or 
denying aggression. These shortfalls are especially problematic in light of the fact that the 
surface fleet will play an increasingly important role in the U.S. Navy’s ability to counter 
enemy attacks. The current fleet is also fiscally unsustainable due to growing operations 
and support costs for today’s highly integrated and manpower-intensive surface 
combatants. New technologies for unmanned systems, sensors, weapons, C3, and 
countermeasures could allow significant improvements in the surface fleet’s ability to 
create complexity for an adversary and harden surface forces from attack while 
improving surface force’s capacity for maritime or land strike.” Retrieved from 
https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/taking-back-the-seas-transforming-the-u.s-
surface-fleet-for-decision-centric-warfare 
• O’Rourke, R. (2020, February 4). Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: 
Background and Issues for Congress (RL32665). Congressional Research Service. 
“DON officials suggest that the INFSA could shift the fleet to a more distributed 
architecture that includes a reduced proportion of larger ships, an increased proportion of 
smaller ships, and a newly created category of large unmanned surface vehicles 
(USVs) and large unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs). Such a change in fleet 
architecture could alter, perhaps substantially, the mix of ships to be procured for the 
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Navy and the distribution of Navy shipbuilding work among the nation’s shipyards.” 
Retrieved from https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL32665/284 
• Eckstein, M. (2020, February 3). SECNAV Modly: Path to 355 Ships Will Rely on New 
Classes of Warships, USNI News. “You look at the frigate program: we think, because of 
the way we’ve approached that program, we’ve probably taken three years off the 
product development lifecycle for that. So we have to start doing the same type of thing: 
looking at proven hulls, things that can be adaptable for different areas. I understand the 
Hill’s concerns about unmanned, and we get that. … We have to convince them with 
data: we have to wargame this, we have to iterate it over and over again.”  
— Honorable Thomas Modly, Acting Secretary of the Navy. 
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